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SHUT OUT: THE DISPUTE OVER MEDIA ACCESS
RIGHTS IN HIGH SCHOOL AND
COLLEGE SPORTS
Alicia Wagner Calzada*
I. INTRODUCTION
The 2007 Illinois state high school football championship game was
a shut-out-of news photographers. While anxious young teenagers
prepared to face their opponents, another match was being played on
the sidelines as photographers were banned from covering the finals
over a dispute regarding the sale of reprints of photos from the game.'
It was a scene that has repeated itself throughout the nation as the
changing nature of the news media collides with athletic associations'
attempts to capitalize on games. Earlier that year, several Louisiana
photographers had been denied access to a girls' basketball tourna-
ment because their newspapers sold reprints of photos published. 2
The following year, an athletic association in Wisconsin sued a news-
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(NPPA) and works to promote access for photojournalists in her role as the NPPA's Advocacy
Chairperson. With over 15 years experience as a photojournalist, Calzada is a candidate for J.D.
in December 2010, at St. Mary's University School of Law. Mrs. Calzada wishes to extend special
gratitude to her husband, Billy Calzada, and family, David, Karen and Stephen Wagner, without
whom her legal studies, her volunteer work, and therefore this article, would not be possible. She
would also like to acknowledge the many friends and mentors who have inspired and supported
this effort, as well as the editors of the DePaul Journal of Sports Law and Contemporary
Problems.
1. See IHSA Shuts out Photographers at state football championships, NATIONAL Piusiss P10-
TOGRAPHIERs AssocATION, November 24, 2007, available at http://www.nppa.org/newsand
events/news/2007/11/illinoisO3.htmi (describing how photographers from five newspapers were
banned from accessing the football field); see also Amended Complaint at 3, Ill. Press Ass'n v.
Ill. High Sch. Ass'n, No. 07-CH-885, (Ill. 7th Cir. Sangamon County Jan. 23, 2008) (alleging
exclusion from the tournament).
2. See Jared Janes, Newspapers battle LHSAA in Hammond: Photographers walk out of Top
28, THE ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.), February 27, 2007 at C1. ("At least four newspaper
photographers were banned from taking pictures at the Ladies' Top 28 Tournament in Ham-
mond after they refused to sign a Louisiana High School Athletic Association consent form.").
See also Scott Ferrell, LHSAA has room for improvement, THE TIMEs (Shreveport, La.), March
4, 2007 at IC (describing how the Louisiana High School Athletic Association demanded that
photographers agree not to sell pictures published online. According to Ferrell, after the state's
newspapers refused to sign the agreement and refused to cover the games, the LHSAA backed
off of the demand. The ban on selling reprints was due to an exclusive contract with a commer-
cial photographer).
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paper for streaming video of a high school football tournament live on
the Internet.3 In the summer of 2009, newspapers and wire services
promised to boycott college football games because of onerous cre-
dential restrictions.4 In late 2009, the Arizona state high school foot-
ball playoff games were not televised for the first time in over 15 years
because of a broadcasting rights dispute between the broadcasters and
the state athletic association.5 Conflicts between news organizations
and athletic associations over access to sporting events involving pub-
lic schools and universities have been a recurring theme over the past
several years. 6 Photographers have been denied access, news organi-
zations have been sued, and in some circumstances, news organiza-
tions have declined to cover these events because they were unwilling
to agree to the terms of credentialing agreements.7 Caught in the mid-
3. Complaint, Wis. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n v. Gannett, No. 08-cv-629 (Wis. Portage
County, filed Dec. 5, 2008).
4. Joe Strupp, SEC Revises Controversial Credential Policy - Most Restrictions Lifted, Ern.
TOR & PUBLISHER, (Aug. 27, 2009) (on file with author).
5. See Steve Burks, Lack of TV for title games is bad business, Ti iE TRIBUNE (Mesa, Ariz.),
Dec. 11, 2009. ("Friday and Saturday will mark the first time since 1993 that the 5A Arizona
state football championships won't be on television, at least in the Valley . . . Cox wanted the
rights to the games it produced for 25 years."). Instead the Arizona Interscholastic Association
has created a Website, complete with commercial advertising, on which games can be watched.
See AIA365, http://www.aia365.com (last visited September 27, 2010).
6. See Jared Janes, Newspapers battle LHSAA in Hammond: Photographers walk out of Top
28, TiIE ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.), February 27, 2007 at Cl. (describing how photogra-
phers were banned from the Ladies' Top 28 Tournament). In the article, Advocate executive
editor Carl Redman stated, that "we are a news gathering organization ... We cannot agree to
have limits on our news gathering abilities." Id. See also, Scott Ferrell, LHSAA has room for
improvement, THE TIMis (Shreveport, La.), March 4, 2007 at IC (describing how the Louisiana
High School Athletic Association demanded that photographers agree not to sell pictures pub-
lished online.) According to Ferrell, after the state's newspapers refused to agree to the restric-
tions and refused to cover the games, the LHSAA backed off of the demand. Scott Ferrell,
LHSAA has room for improvement, Tin TIMES (Shreveport, La.), March 4, 2007 at IC. See also
Wis. Newspaper, Sports Group Face off Over Rights to Webcast Games, AssoCIA TED' PRE!.SS, June
8, 2009 (describing how the Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Association (WIAA) has sued
media company Gannett and the Wisconsin Newspaper Association). A newspaper broadcasted
four games live on the Internet against the wishes of WIAA and the WIAA is seeking a ruling
that it owns web broadcast rights. The initial lawsuit filed by the WIAA sought a ruling that it
owned "writing, photography, video and any Internet form of journalism from live blogging to
Webcasts," however all but the Webcast rights issue were dropped. Wis. Newspaper, Sports
Group Face off Over Rights to Webcast Games, ASSOCIATED PRss, June 8, 2009. Cf. Newspa-
pers, IPA, Sue ISA For Free Press Rights, NATIONAL PRESS PHOTOGRAPIiERS ASSOCIATION,
November 2, 2007 http://www.nppa.org/news-andevents/news/2007/11/illinois.html (describing
the suit between the Illinois Newspapers and the Illinois High School Association).
7. See Scott Ferrell, LHSAA has room for improvement, THm TIMES (Shreveport, La.), March
4, 2007 at IC (explaining that after the state's newspapers refused to sign the agreement and
refused to cover the games, the LHSAA backed off of the demand. The ban on selling reprints
was due to an exclusive contract with a commercial photographer); Wis. Newspaper, Sports
Group Face off Over Rights to Webcast Games, AssoCiATED PRESS, June 8, 2009 (describing how
the Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Association (WIAA) has sued media company Gannett
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die are student athletes, whose successes and triumphs fall by the way-
side while media companies and athletic associations debate
intellectual property, access, and of course, money.
High school athletic associations typically sponsor, organize and
promote state championship tournaments between high school teams
in a broad range of athletic and other competitive events.8 For years,
the coverage of these events by news organizations has been mutually
beneficial, but recent developments, discussed below, have made it
profitable for the associations to limit such coverage. In the ensuing
conflicts between newspapers and state high school athletic associa-
tions, rights asserted by the associations have ranged from attempts to
claim the ownership of descriptions of games9 - in which there is no
property right' 0 - to the closer question of broadcast rights. Of pri-
mary concern typically are three related issues: The rights of newspa-
pers to sell reprints of photographs that appear on their websites;1n
the rights of television stations and newspapers to broadcast extended
video clips or live broadcasts of the games; and rights of the teams and
and the Wisconsin Newspaper Association. A newspaper had broadcast four games live on the
Internet against the wishes of WIAA and the WIAA sued. The initial lawsuit filed by the WIAA
sought a ruling that it owned "writing, photography, video and any Internet form of journalism
from live blogging to Webcasts," however all but the Webcast rights claim were dropped.); see
also Mickey H. Osterreicher, Illinois Press Association Asks To Withdraw Preliminary Injunc-
tion, NATIONAL PRESS PITOTOGRAPHERs ASSOCIATION, (Nov. 16, 2007), (on file with author),
available at http://www.nppa.org/news and events/news/2007/11/illinois02.html (describing the
conflict between the sports association and the newspapers).
8. See First Amended Complaint at 5-6, Wis. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n v. Gannett Co.,
No. 09-cv-155-wmc, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55137 (W.D. Wis. June 3, 2010), appeal docketed, No
10-2627 (7th Cir. July 7, 2010) (explaining the history and function of WIAA).
9. Complaint, Wis. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n v. Gannett, No. 08-cv-629 (Wis. Portage
County, filed Dec. 5, 2008) (seeking a declaratory judgment "that it has ownership rights in any
transmission, internet stream, photo, image, film, videotape, audiotape, writing, drawing or other
depiction or description of any game, game action, game information ... of an athletic event that
it sponsors.").
10. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1990) (defining the subject matter of copyright); see also NBA v.
Motorola, 105 F.3d 841, 846 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding no copyright in the statistics of the game);
WCVB-TV v. Boston Athletic Ass'n, 926 F.2d 42, 43 (1st Cir. 1991) (denying a preliminary
injunction to prevent a TV station from broadcasting the Boston Marathon when another had
contracted for "exclusive" broadcast rights with the race organizers). But see Post Newsweek
Stations-Conn., Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 510 F. Supp. 81, 84 (D. Conn. 1981) (finding a proprie-
tary right). The court held: "It is clear that the ISU has a legitimate commercial stake in this
event, and they, like Zacchini, are entitled to contract regarding the distribution of this en-
tertainment product." Id. It is worth noting that in Travelers, the state actor's proprietary activ-
ity was leasing the facility to a private entity, not hosting an event themselves. Id.
11. Scott Ferrell, LHSAA has room for improvement, THIE TIMES (Shreveport, La.), March 4,
2007 at IC (describing how the Louisiana High School Athletic Association demanded that pho-
tographers agree not to sell pictures published online).
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associations to demand licensing privileges regarding photographs and
videos taken during games, and stories written about the games.12
While access issues exist in professional sports as well, these issues
are unique in high school and college athletic associations because of
the overwhelming public nature of the schools involved, and the likeli-
hood that the associations will be determined to be state actors by the
courts.13 As a result, the various questions boil down to one main con-
cern: How much can a state actor limit the editorial output of a news
organization covering a state sponsored event, and can it deny or
grant access based on an agreement to comply with limitations on
such output?
The question of media rights in high school and college sports is a
complex one involving an intersection of property rights, intellectual
property rights, contract rights and First Amendment rights. Unjust
enrichment, anti-trust and unfair competition all have the potential to
enter the equation. And of course, none of the above would be impor-
tant if financial interests of the schools, associations, and members of
the media were not involved.14 Case history indicates a strong pre-
sumption against the government's ability to restrict truthful publica-
tion, such that any interest the associations have in the financial
benefits of restrictions must be balanced against the cost to society of
denying the First Amendment rights of the news organizations.15
12. Id.; see also Wis. Newspaper, Sports Group Face off Over Rights to Webcast Games, Asso-
CiAT PRESS, June 8, 2009 (dispute over Web broadcast rights); Joe Strupp, SEC Revises Contro-
versial Credential Policy - Most Restrictions Lifted, Eurroiz & PUBLISHER, (Aug. 27, 2009) (on
file with author) (describing initial terms of controversial credential agreement for the South-
eastern Conference which included restrictions on website video and audio footage, limits on
live blogging and required newspapers to grant the SEC and universities permission to use pho-
tographs taken at the games. After several news organizations threatened to boycott the games,
most of the restrictions were eased).
13. See Wis. Interscholastic Ath. Ass'n v. Gannett Co., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55137, at * 28
n.6 (W.D. Wis.) (noting that the parties stipulated that the WIAA is a state actor, and declining
to rule on the matter). See also Wakefield v. Wis. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, No.
2008CV003423 at 7 (Wis. Milwaukee County Sep. 12, 2008) (noting that nearly every state that
the court looked at found similar associations to be state actors). There is some argument for
imposing public openness standards on professional sports that receive tax breaks or subsidies
from cities, but that is for another article.
14. First Amended Complaint at 7-8, Wis. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n v. Gannett Co., No.
09-cv-155-wmc, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55137 (W.D. Wis. June 3, 2010), appeal docketed, No 10-
2627 (7th Cir. July 7, 2010) ("Fees generated through the granting of transmission and broadcast
licenses, including over the Internet, serve the important purpose of generating revenue for the
WIAA.").
15. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 528 (2001) ("As a general matter, state action to
punish the publication of truthful information seldom can satisfy constitutional standards."); Ca-
rey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 462 (1980) ("When government regulation discriminates among
speech-related activities in a public forum, the Equal Protection Clause mandates that the legis-
lation be finely tailored to serve substantial state interests, and the justifications offered for any
[Vol. 7:1
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Because of the enormous public pressure to provide a visual report
of these events, only one of the conflicts above has reached a court of
law; the others have typically been settled through negotiations.16 In
the one case that did receive a ruling, a question about the right to
restrict reprint sales was dropped from the case, and a judge deter-
mined that the only issues remaining related to the dispute over live
Web streaming of games, ultimately deciding that the athletic associa-
tion had the right to control this activity.17 In Illinois, a settlement
between newspapers and that state's athletic association provides that
the newspapers can sell reprints, the association will give full access,
and there will not be preferential access given to an "official" photog-
rapher.18 Pending state legislation in Illinois, which would have pre-
vented bans on newspaper reprint sales, was dropped after the
settlement was reached.' 9 Legislation was also brought in Wisconsin,
but ultimately failed. 20
distinctions it draws must be carefully scrutinized."); N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S.
713, 714 (1971) ("Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this court bearing a
heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.").
16. See Wis. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n v. Gannett Co., No. 09-cv-155-wmc, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 55137, (W.D. Wis. June 3, 2010), appeal docketed, No 10-2627 (7th Cir. July 7, 2010)
(limiting the court's ruling to four issues related to the Webcast of football games); Scott Ferrell,
LHSAA has room for improvement, Tin- TimEs (Shreveport, La.), March 4, 2007 at 1C (describ-
ing how the Louisiana High School Athletic Association demanded that photographers agree
not to sell pictures published online. According to Ferrell, after the state's newspapers refused to
sign the agreement and refused to cover the games, the LHSAA backed off of the demand. The
ban on selling reprints was due to an exclusive contract with a commercial photographer);
Mickey H. Osterreicher, Illinois Press Association Asks To Withdraw Preliminary Injunction,
NATIONAL PRESS PHOTOGRAPHERs ASSOCIATION, (November 16, 2007), (on file with author),
available at http://www.nppa.org/news-and-events/news/2007/11/illinois02.html.
17. Wis. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n v. Gannett Co., No. 09-cv-155-wmc, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 55137, at *27, *74-75 (W.D. Wis. June 3, 2010), appeal docketed, No 10-2627 (7th Cir. July
7, 2010). The case is currently being appealed.
18. IllinoisPress.org, Joint IPA/IHSA Statement, available at http://illinoispress.org/index.php?
view=article&catid=27%3Agovernment-news&id= 156%3Aipaihsa-statement&format=pdf&op-
tion=com content&Itemid=165 (last visited September 27, 2010) (describing the conditions of
the settlement between the Illinois High School Association and the Illinois Press Association).
The settlement agreed that the newspapers would not be restricted in how they use or sell
images, and that the "official" IHSA photographer would not have preferential access.
19. See Illinois Press Association, IHSA, Settle Photography Dispute, NATIONAL PRESS P110-
TOGRAPHERS AssOcIATION, April 8, 2008, available at http://www.nppa.org/news andevents/
news/2008/04/illinoisl.html (last visited September 27, 2010) ("The terms of the settlement
agreement call for the withdrawal of Illinois legislation, introduced in the state's Senate and
House in January and already passed in the House.").
20. Assem. B. 520, 2009-10 Leg., 99th Sess. (Wis. 2009) (failed to pass, April 28, 2010) (pro-
posing that school districts be prohibited from "being a member of an interscholastic athletic
association unless the association agrees to be governed by the public records and open meetings
laws."); Editorial: Public deserves a window on decisions, GREEN BAY PREss-GAZETIE (Wis.),
January 17, 2010 at A12.
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As this Article will explain, there is plenty of case law to provide an
examination of the issues. Many courts have found that it is a violation
of the First Amendment for a state actor to restrict a news organiza-
tion from publishing truthful, legally obtained information. Although
the athletic associations apparently consider reprints to be commercial
activity, the sale of photographic prints, especially when they are sold
in connection with First Amendment activities, have repeatedly been
protected by the First Amendment. 21
This Article will first establish the associations as state actors and
clarify the relationship of copyright law to reporting sporting events.
In Parts IV and V, it will discuss the relationship of equal protection
to the First Amendment, and the rights of the government to impose
restrictions on the media, including the application of "time, place,
and manner" restrictions. Part VI will spotlight the various controver-
sial terms in the Wisconsin credentials. Parts VII and IIX will explore
what kind of restrictions on coverage are permissible and defenses
that might be raised.
II. BACKGROUND
Newspapers have traditionally sold copies, called "reprints," of pho-
tographs that appear in their publications, as a service to the commu-
nity.22 For decades, subjects who appear in the newspaper have been
able to obtain reprints for their own personal use.23 More recently, as
newspapers transitioned to the Internet, the space limitations of the
printed product have disappeared and photographs that do not appear
in the physical newspaper can be displayed on a publication's Web-
21. See Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, 34 Cal. App. 4th 790 (Ct. App. 1995) (finding that
posters reproducing newspaper front pages that had a photograph of quarterback Joe Montana
were entitled to First Amendment protection, just as the original newspaper accounts were. The
posters were a "form of public interest presentation to which protection must be extended."); see
also Nussenzweig v. DiCorcia, 814 N.Y.S.2d 891 (Sup. Ct. 2006), affd, 832 N.Y.S.2d 510 (App.
Div.), aff'd, 9 N.Y.3d 184 (2007) (holding that the sale of photographic prints of a Hassidic Jew
who asserted a privacy claim was protected by the First Amendment because it was art). The
court explained: "In recent years, some New York courts have addressed the issue whether an
artistic use of an image is a use exempted from action under New York States Privacy Laws.
They have consistently found "art" to be constitutionally protected free speech, that is so ex-
empt. This court agrees." Id.
22. Amended Complaint at 3-4, Ill. Press Ass'n v. Ill. High Sch. Ass'n, No. 07-CH-885, (Ill.
7th Cir. Sangamon County Jan. 23, 2008) ("Plaintiffs. . . [p]rovide photos, either at no charge or
at nominal charge. .. to families of athletes... . and sell reprints of photographs and stories to
parties who request those product[s].").
23. Id. at 2 ("The use of the [I]nternet has allowed newspapers to publish galleries of photo-
graphs for their communities.").
[Vol. 7:1
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site.24 Extensive online "photo galleries" have become standard fea-
tures on news websites, due in part to the high "click-through"
numbers that bring in online advertising dollars. 25 Often using a
printing partnership, but sometimes handling the reprints in-house,
images in photo galleries, just like images in the printed edition, are
available for reprint purchase. 2 6
At the same time as newspapers have expanded the number of
images available for reprint purchase, private commercial photogra-
phers have made exclusive deals with high school athletic associations
to photograph tournaments and games and provide their own exten-
sive online photo galleries for student athletes to purchase reprints of
images from the games.27 As the official tournament photographers,
the commercial photographers demand exclusive access, and in ex-
change, provide compensation to the associations.28 This compensa-
tion is often monetary but can be in the form of licensing rights to
images used for marketing and promotion.29
24. Jared Janes, Newspapers battle LHSAA in Hammond: Photographers walk out of Top 28,
TiHiE AovocATE (Baton Rouge, La.), February 27, 2007 at C1 (explaining that "a newspaper
typically could only print two photographs in its printed edition but provide 15 to 20 photo-
graphs on its Web site, giving its audience a better perspective of the event.").
25. See, e.g., Old idea, new media Ink may fade, but thirst for news won't, THE ToRzoNTo STAR4
December 12, 2005, at D1 (explaining how the newspaper is "embellishing the site with staff
photo galleries of community news and sports events.").
26. Amended Complaint at 3-4, Ill. Press Ass'n v. Ill. High Sch. Ass'n, No. 07-CH-885, (Ill.
7th Cir. Sangamon County Jan. 23, 2008) ("Plaintiffs.... sell reprints of photographs and stories
to parties who request those product[s].").
27. See Exhibit A, Ill. Press Ass'n v. Ill. High Sch. Ass'n, No. 07-CH-885, (Ill. 7th Cir. Sanga-
mon County Dec. 5, 2007) (outlining the 2005-2006 licensing agreement between commercial
photography company Visual Image Photography, Inc., and the Illinois High School Association,
including "[e]xtend photographic exclusivity to VIP. No other photography company to be per-
mitted to photograph State Final events with the intent to sell. This includes all award ceremo-
nies and action photography."); see also Exhibit A at 2, Wis. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n v.
Gannett Co., No. 09-cv-155-wmc, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55137 (W.D. Wis. June 3, 2010), appeal
docketed, No 10-2627 (7th Cir. July 7, 2010) (outlining agreement for the WIAA to grant "the
exclusive right to produce, sell, and distribute all WIAA tournament series and championship
events for all WIAA sports" to a production company).
28. See Exhibit A, Ill. Press Ass'n v. Ill. High Sch. Ass'n, No. 07-CH-885, (Ill. 7th Cir. Sanga-
mon County Dec. 5, 2007) (explaining the "photographic exclusivity" that the commercial pho-
tographer has); see also Exhibit A at 2, Wis. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n v. Gannett Co., No.
09-cv-155-wmc, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55137 (W.D. Wis. June 3, 2010), appeal docketed, No 10-
2627 (7th Cir. July 7, 2010) (extending exclusivity to a video production company).
29. See Exhibit A at 3, Ill. Press Ass'n v. Ill. High Sch. Ass'n, No. 07-CH-885, (Ill. 7th Cir.
Sangamon County Dec. 5, 2007) (explaining how the images will be made available to the IHSA
at no charge); see also Exhibit A at 2, Wis. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n v. Gannett Co., No. 09-
cv-155-wmc, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55137 (W.D. Wis. June 3, 2010), appeal docketed, No 10-
2627 (7th Cir. July 7, 2010) (explaining the revenue sharing agreement).
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In addition to still photographic coverage, there is extensive televi-
sion coverage of state tournaments.30 Important games have been
broadcast through agreements with television stations.31 Again, the
Internet complicates matters as the ability to stream games live over
the Internet is now a reality and new media, as well as traditional
newspapers with new platforms are getting involved in broadcasting
events online.32 To combat concerns that this will impact exclusive
broadcast deals, state athletic associations are imposing various limits
on live and "real-time" reporting of tournaments, as well as time lim-
its on the length of video being broadcast after the games.33
In March of 2007, newspaper photographers in Louisiana walked
out of a basketball tournament when they were denied access for re-
fusing to sign a credential agreement that would restrict the right to
sell reprints from the game.34 Later that year, photographers in Illi-
nois were similarly blocked from covering the state football champi-
onships because their newspapers would not agree to stop selling
reprints.35 The Illinois High School Association (IHSA) had entered
into an exclusive contract for photography with a private party and
newspaper reprints allegedly ran afoul of this agreement. 36
With similar concerns, the Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Asso-
ciation (WIAA) filed suit against newspaper corporation Gannett,
and the Wisconsin Newspaper Association (WNA) in late 2008, assert-
30. See Steve Burks, Lack of TV for title games is bad business, TInu TRIBUNE (Mesa, Ariz.),
Dec. 11, 2009 (describing how the championship game had been televised since 1993).
31. Id.
32. See First Amended Complaint at 9, Wis. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n v. Gannett Co., No.
09-cv-155-wmc, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55137 (W.D. Wis. June 3, 2010), appeal docketed, No 10-
2627 (7th Cir. July 7, 2010) (explaining how the Appleton Post-Crescent broadcast at least four
football games on the Internet).
33. See id. at 6-8 (explaining WIAA media policies).
34. See, e.g., Scott Ferrell, LHSAA has room for improvement, Ti TIMEss (Shreveport, La.),
March 4, 2007 at IC (describing how the Louisiana High School Athletic Association demanded
that photographers agree not to sell pictures published online. According to Ferrell, after the
state's newspapers refused to sign the agreement and refused to cover the games, the LHSAA
backed off of the demand. The ban on selling reprints was due to an exclusive contract with a
commercial photographer); see also Jared Janes, Newspapers battle LHSAA in Hammond: Pho-
tographers walk out of Top 28, Tini AovoceArE; (Baton Rouge, La.), February 27, 2007 at C1.
("At least four newspaper photographers were banned from taking pictures at the Ladies' Top
28 Tournament in Hammond after they refused to sign a Louisiana High School Athletic Associ-
ation consent form.").
35. Amended Complaint at 3, Ill. Press Ass'n v. Ill. High Sch. Ass'n, No. 07-CH-885, (Il. 7th
Cir. Sangamon County Jan. 23, 2008) ("In November 2007, Defendant excluded some Illinois
newspapers from the IHSA State Football finals because those newspapers would not abide by
Defendant's rule concerning secondary use.").
36. Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint at 4, Ill. Press Ass'n v. Ill. High Sch. Ass'n, No.
07-CH-885, (Ill. 7th Cir. Sangamon County Dec. 5, 2007) (describing the exclusive contract and
the corresponding media policy).
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ing that WIAA owned "the transmission, internet stream, photo, im-
age, film, videotape, audiotape, writing, drawing or other depiction or
description of any game, game action, game information, or any com-
mercial used of the same of an athletic event that it sponsors."37 The
WIAA suit came about after a newspaper owned by Gannett broad-
cast a live "Webcast" of a football game that was sponsored by the
WIAA.38 The case was removed to federal court, and the complaint
was amended to include fewer assertions.39 The district court ulti-
mately ruled against the newspapers, but also determined that the
only issues remaining were four issues related to the right of the news-
papers to broadcast Webcasts of games without permission from the
athletic association and the right of the athletic association to prevent
such activity.40
Continuing this conflict, media organizations threatened to boycott
coverage of the 2009 college football season in the Southeastern Con-
ference (SEC) because the restrictions on coverage were too oner-
ous. 4 1 The objectionable conditions included: A total ban on video
coverage on newspaper websites; limits on the use of photographs af-
ter the game coverage ended; and a requirement that news organiza-
tions grant the SEC and the universities licensing rights to images
obtained at the games.42 The SEC eventually eased most of these re-
37. Complaint, Wis. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n v. Gannett at 5-6, No. 08-cv-629 (Wis. Port-
age County, filed Dec. 5, 2008) (describing the declaratory judgment being sought by WIAA in
state court).
38. Wis. Newspaper, Sports Group Face off Over Rights to Webcast Games, AsSOCIATED
PREss, June 8, 2009 (describing how the Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Association (WIAA)
has sued media company Gannett and the Wisconsin Newspaper Association. A newspaper had
broadcast four games live on the Internet against the wishes of WIAA and the WIAA filed suit
seeking a ruling that it owns web broadcast rights. The initial lawsuit filed by the WIAA sought a
ruling that it owned "writing, photography, video and any Internet form of journalism from live
blogging to Webcasts," however all but the Webcast rights claim were dropped in subsequent
pleadings.); see Complaint, Wis. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n v. Gannett, No. 08-cv-629 (Wis.
Portage County, filed Dec. 5, 2008) (describing the declaratory judgment being sought by WIAA
in state court).
39. First Amended Complaint at 11, Wis. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n v. Gannett Co., No.
09-cv-155-wmc, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55137 (W.D. Wis. June 3, 2010), appeal docketed, No 10-
2627 (7th Cir. July 7, 2010) (describing the new declaratory judgment being sought by WIAA in
federal court).
40. Wis. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n v. Gannett Co., No. 09-cv-155-wmc, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 55137, at *27, *74-75 (W.D. Wis. June 3, 2010), appeal docketed, No 10-2627 (7th Cir. July
7, 2010).
41. Joe Strupp, SEC Revises Controversial Credential Policy - Most Restrictions Lifted, Em-
TOR & PUBLISHE-R, (Aug. 27, 2009) (on file with author) (describing initial terms of controversial
credential agreement for the Southeastern Conference and ensuing boycott).
42. Id.
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strictions, including removing limits on post-game use of photos and
removing the licensing privileges requirement.43
III. THRESHOLD ISSUES CRITICAL TO FRAMING THE DEBATE
A. State Athletic Associations are State Actors
State athletic associations are generally state actors.44 This standard
has been repeatedly met with athletic associations whose membership
involves public schools, as long as it is properly asserted.45 The Su-
preme Court of the United States has held at least one state athletic
association to be a state actor, and many lower courts have found sim-
ilar status.46 State actor status of athletic associations is often ad-
dressed in equal protection cases based on race or gender, or due
process claims.47 However, the status as a state actor cannot be taken
43. Id. (describing how after several news organizations threatened to boycott the games,
most of the restrictions were eased).
44. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001)
(finding state action in a First Amendment case involving a state athletic association); Griffin
High School v. Ill. High School Ass'n., 822 F.2d 671, 674 (7th Cir. 1987) ("[Tlhe overwhelmingly
public character of the IHSA membership is sufficient to confer state action for the purposes of
§ 1983."); Libby v. South Inter-Conference Ass'n, 728 F. Supp. 504, 506 (N.D. Ill. 1990) ("In any
event, IHSA clearly is a state actor."); Wakefield v. Wis. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, No.
2008CV003423 at 7 (Wis. Milwaukee County Sep. 12, 2008) ("[T]his [c]ourt holds that there is a
sufficient basis to consider the WIAA a state actor in reviewing its decisions about student inter-
scholastic athletics eligibility."). In WIAA v. Gannett, it was stipulated by both parties that the
WIAA is a state actor. Wis. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n v. Gannett Co., No. 09-cv-155-wmc,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55137, at *28 n.6 (W.D. Wis. June 3, 2010), appeal docketed, No 10-2627
(7th Cir. July 7, 2010).
45. See Wakefield v. Wis. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, No. 2008CV003423 at 7 n.1 (noting
that nearly every state that the court looked at found similar associations to be state actors). But
see, Kelly v. Wis. Intersch. Athletic Ass'n., 367 F. Supp. 1388, 1390 (E.D. Wis. 1974) (dismissing
an equal protection claim against the WIAA because the plaintiff failed to allege facts that
would find state action).
46. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001)
(finding state action in a First Amendment case involving a state athletic association). The Court
explained: "[Sitate action may be found if, though only if, there is such a 'close nexus between
the State and the challenged action' that seemingly private behavior 'may be fairly treated as
that of the State itself."' Id. The court went on to explain that "[i]f a defendant's conduct satis-
fies the state-action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment, the conduct also constitutes
action "under color of state law" for § 1983 purposes." Id. at 294. See also Tenn. Secondary Sch.
Athletic Ass'n v. Brentwood Acad., 551 U.S. 291, 295 (2007) (re-stating the state action element
of the same case). The Tennessee association involves "public schools located within the State,
acts through their representatives, draws its officers from them, is largely funded by their dues
and income received in their stead, and has historically been seen to regulate in lieu of the State
Board of Education's exercise of its own authority." Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch.
Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 290 (2001). The court held that the group's "regulatory activity may
and should be treated as state action owing to the pervasive entwinement of state school officials
in the structure of the association." Id. at 291.
47. See, e.g., Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295
(2001) ("If a defendant's conduct satisfies the state-action requirement of the Fourteenth
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for granted. 48 In any case involving a First Amendment or Equal Pro-
tection claim, it is critical to establish the status as a state actor first.
Failure to do so could lead to dismissal for failure to state a claim. 49
As state actors, the associations have a right to act in some proprietary
capacity, but not to the same extent as a private business.50
B. Photography is a First Amendment Activity
Photography and videography are First Amendment activities, both
as an expressive activity,5' and as newsgathering.52 While sporting
events are often considered entertainment, they are also news.53
Sports played by public schools and universities are particularly news-
worthy because schools are funded by taxpayer dollars, regulated by
elected lawmakers and are an integral part of the lives of most Ameri-
Amendment, the conduct also constitutes action 'under color of state law' for § 1983
purposes.").
48. See, e.g., Kelly v. Wis. Intersch. Athletic Ass'n., 367 F. Supp. 1388, 1390 (E.D. Wis. 1974)
(dismissing an equal protection claim against the WIAA because the plaintiff failed to allege
facts that would find state action).
49. Id.
50. United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 725 (1990) (stating that while "[t]he Government's
ownership of property does not automatically open that property to the public ... [t]he Govern-
ment, even when acting in its proprietary capacity, does not enjoy absolute freedom from First
Amendment constraints, as does a private business"). In Kokinda, a case about the right to
petition on U.S. Post Office property, the Supreme Court found (in a plurality opinion) that
regulation of speech activity on government property, unless it was a public forum, required
reasonableness. Id. Kokinda was a speech case, not an access case and so a traditional public
forum analysis applied. Id. See also D'Amario v. Providence Civic Ctr. Auth., 639 F. Supp. 1538,
1543 (D.R.I. 1986) (commenting in an access case that "the state's rulemaking power is not
absolute .. . the limitations upon access must serve a legitimate governmental purpose, must be
rationally related to the accomplishment of that purpose, and must outweigh the systemic bene-
fits inherent in unrestricted (or lesser-restricted) access.").
51. See, e.g., Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 646 (1984) (finding that a statute banning the
use of images of currency based on the purpose of the use was an unconstitutional content-based
restriction); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 187 (1964) ("Motion pictures are within the ambit
of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press."); ETW Corp. v. Jireh
Publ'g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 938 (6th Cir. 2003) ("The protection of the First Amendment is not
limited to written or spoken words, but includes other mediums of expression, including music,
pictures, films, photographs, paintings, drawings, engravings, prints, and sculptures."); Bery v.
City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 696 (2d Cir. 1996) ("[P]aintings, photographs, prints and sculp-
tures. . . always communicate some idea or concept to those who view it, and as such are entitled
to full First Amendment protection.").
52. Beacon Journal Publ. Co. v. Blackwell, 389 F.3d 683 (6th Cir. 2004) (ordering Ohio Secre-
tary of State and Summit County (Ohio) Board of Elections to permit newsgathering near pol-
ling places); Stevens v. N.Y. Racing Ass'n, 665 F. Supp. 164 (E.D.N.Y. 1987); Montana v. San
Jose Mercury News, 34 Cal. App. 4th 790 (Ct. App. 1995).
53. Morris Commc'n v. PGA Tour, Inc., 364 F.3d 1288, 1293 n.9 (11th Cir. 2004) (explaining
that PGA had no problem journalists disseminating the news of the game); see also Post News-
week Stations-Conn., Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 510 F. Supp. 81, 84 (D. Conn. 1981) (calling a
World Figure Skating competition an "entertainment product").
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can children. 54 While reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions
can be imposed on the media by the government, those restrictions
are typically related to conduct during newsgathering, and do not gen-
erally permit restrictions on how the information can later be used.5 5
C. There is no Copyright in a sporting event itself
Although some teams have attempted to assert intellectual property
rights to the games themselves, 56 there is no copyright in a sporting
event, the facts of the game or even the statistics and scores.57 Copy-
right is only available for a work of authorship that is "fixed in a tangi-
ble medium."58 It does not vest in ideas, facts or events.59 Thus while a
broadcast of a football game is protected by copyright law, 60 it is the
broadcast or film itself, not the game which is protected.61 This is im-
portant because a photographer is not intruding on the copyright of
the game by taking photos of the game. If access to the game were not
required, the photographer would not need to deal with the team at
54. See Miami Herald Pub. Co., Div. of Knight Newspapers, Inc. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 257
(1974) ("[There] is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of [the First] Amend-
ment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.").
55. Compare Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1 (1978) (permitting restrictions on access) with
Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 646 (1984) (finding that a content-based restriction was uncon-
stitutional) and N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (finding prior restraint
on publication unconstitutional).
56. Complaint, Wis. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n v. Gannett, No. 08-cv-629 (Wis. Portage
County, filed Dec. 5, 2008) (asking for a declaratory judgment that WIAA "has ownership rights
in any transmission, internet stream, photo, image, film, videotape, audiotape, writing, drawing
or other depiction or description of any game, game action, game information . . . of an athletic
event that it sponsors.").
57. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1990) (listing the subject matter which can be copyrighted and not
listing sporting events, or anything close to it); Feist Publ'g, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S.
340, 350 (1991) ("Facts, whether alone or as part of a compilation, are not original and therefore
may not be copyrighted."); NBA v. Motorola, 105 F.3d 841, 846 (2d Cir. 1997) ("In our view, the
underlying basketball games do not fall within the subject matter of federal copyright protection
because they do not constitute 'original works of authorship."').
58. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1990).
59. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1990) ("In no case does copyright protection for an original work of
authorship extend to any idea.").
60. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1990) ("Works of authorship include the following catego-
ries: . .. motion pictures and other audiovisual works"); see also NBA v. Motorola, 105 F.3d 841,
847 (2d Cir. 1997) (explaining that "it is the broadcast, not the underlying game that is the
subject of copyright protection.").
61. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1990) ("Works of authorship include the following categories. ..
motion pictures and other audiovisual works").
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all.6 2 There have been some successful misappropriation claims in-
volving events and facts, but they all involved private entities. 63
62. See Detroit-Base Ball Club v. Deppert, 61 Mich. 63 (Mich. 1886) (finding that a neighbor
to a baseball field could legally sell tickets to stands he erected which had a view of the game);
see also NBA v. Motorola, 105 F.3d 841, 847 (2d Cir. 1997) (explaining that "it is the broadcast,
not the underlying game that is the subject of copyright protection."). But see Pittsburgh Athletic
Co. v. KQV Broad. Co., 24 F. Supp. 490, 492 (D. Pa. 1938) (granting a preliminary injunction to
the Pittsburgh Pirates, banning defendants from broadcasting game statistics obtained by report-
ers based outside of stadium, and finding that broadcast rights are "a property right of the plain-
tiffs with which defendant is interfering when it broadcasts the play-by-play description of the
ball games."). KQV had leased property that allowed a view of the baseball game, and paid
observers to provide play-by-play information from that vantage point. Id. The KQV court made
its ruling based unfair competition and misappropriation. Id. For an interesting discussion of the
implications of watching sports without accessing the stadium, see Ronnie Bitman, Note, Rock-
ing Wrigley: The Chicago Cubs' Off-Field Struggle to Compete for Ticket Sales with its Rooftop
Neighbors, 56 FrD. COMM. L.J. 377, 388 (2004) (addressing the various rights at play between the
Chicago Cubs and its neighbors).
63. The Supreme Court recognized a "hot news" claim in Int'l News Serv. v. AP, 248 U.S. 215,
238 (1918) and in 1977, the Court applied a right-of-publicity claim to the media's coverage of an
event, stating that "we are quite sure that the First and Fourteenth Amendments do not immu-
nize the media when they broadcast a performer's entire act without his consent." See Zacchini
v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 575 (1977). The Zacchini case was decided on
the basis of the performer's "right of publicity." Facts that were critical to the Zacchini decision
included that the entire 15-second performance was shown after the performer told the film-
maker not to film the act, and the fact that the act was one that the performer ordinarily got paid
for. Id. Some disturbing dicta in Zacchini failed to distinguish between copyrightable perform-
ances and non-copyrightable sporting events. The Court wrote, "[t]he Constitution no more pre-
vents a State from requiring respondent to compensate petitioner for broadcasting his act on
television than it would privilege respondent to film and broadcast a copyrighted dramatic work
without liability to the copyright owner." Id. This statement is in line with the Copyrights Act
because dramatic works are copyrightable. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1990) ("Works of authorship
include... dramatic works"). However, the Court went on to state (again as dicta) that similar
rights existed when broadcasting a boxing match and a baseball game, "where the promoters or
the participants had other plans for publicizing the event," Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad-
casting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 575 (1977) (citing Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229
F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 926 (1956) and Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV
Broadcasting Co., 24 F.Supp. 490 (W.D. Pa. 1938)). Multiple federal courts since Zacchini that
have declined to find copyright in an athletic games or other events (it is the broadcast that is
copyrighted). See, e.g., Prod. Contractors, Inc. v. WGN Cont'l Broad. Co., 622 F. Supp. 1500,
1503(N.D. Ill. 1985) (finding that a parade is not a work of authorship and not entitled to copy-
right protection); Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n., 805 F.2d 663,
676 (7th Cir. 1986) (explaining the difference in the copyrightability of the broadcast, and the
lack of copyrightability in the performance of the players). In Post Newsweek Stations-Connecti-
cut, Inc. v. Travelers Insurance Co., 510 F. Supp. 81, (D. Conn. 1981), a federal court in Connecti-
cut found that the organizers of the 1981 World Figure Skating Championships had a proprietary
interest in the games. Id. Because the state-owned facility was proprietary in nature, the govern-
ment could impose restrictions that were not arbitrary in nature (in that case, allowing those who
leased the property to use an indemnity agreement as a condition of access). Id. Zacchini also
rested on the notion that the property right in the performance came from the fact that "this act
is the product of petitioner's own talents and energy, the end result of much time, effort, and
expense." Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 575 (1977). In the case of
high school and college athletics, the games are the product of the talent and energy of the
athletes, as well as the schools and associations. Zacchini has the potential to persuade judges
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has held
specifically that there is no copyright in a sporting event. 64 In NBA v.
Motorola,65 the Second Circuit declined to grant the professional bas-
ketball league exclusive rights to the facts and statistics surrounding
their games.66 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit did grant a sports league, the PGA Tour, a right to charge for
licensing the use of real-time statistics in Morris Communications v.
PGA Tour, Inc.6 7 However, that suit was based on an antitrust claim
and decided in part based on the complex nature of obtaining the sta-
tistics themselves.68 The PGA had created an elaborate system for de-
termining the real-time statistics - which could not be replicated by
simply viewing the game by one or two reporters - and because the
real-time statistics were only accessible from inside the PGA-con-
trolled press box, the PGA Tour had a right to control the conditions
under which the statistics were used. Such control didn't violate anti-
trust laws, and was permissible even though there was no copyright in
the statistics (PGA did not assert copyright ownership of the statis-
tics). 6 9 Morris Communications does not conflict with Motorola and it
does not stand for the proposition that an athletic association - pub-
lic or private - has a right to control information or content that the
journalist herself gathers. 70 There is not likely to be a proprietary in-
terest akin to that in Morris Communications, (or like the proprietary
regarding the rights of a complete live broadcast of a game, but is unlikely to have an effect on
the use of game footage in news broadcasts or of reprint use.
64. See NBA v. Motorola, 105 F.3d 841, 846 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding that a professional basket-
ball game was not copyrightable according to statutory definition because it is not a "work of
authorship.") The copyright statute includes the following categories as "works of authorship":
"(1) literary works; (2) musical works, including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic works,
including any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural works;(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; (7) sound record-
ings; and (8) architectural works." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1990). This concept holds true regarding
other public events as well. See, e.g., Prod. Contractors, Inc. v. WGN Cont'l Broad. Co., 622 F.
Supp. 1500, 1504 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (finding that a parade was not a "work of authorship").
65. 105 F.3d 841(2d Cir. 1997).
66. NBA v. Motorola, 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997).
67. Morris Commc'n v. PGA Tour, Inc., 364 F.3d 1288, 1291 (11th Cir. 2004).
68. Id. (describing the complex nature of developing the real-time statistics).
69. Id. at 1291 ("The nature of a PGA golf tournament makes it impossible for one person to
physically follow all the players at once. First, the average golf course spans approximately 150
acres and various golfers play numerous holes simultaneously. In addition, the PGA does not
allow its invitees to use cell phones and hand-held devices on the course because such devices
might disrupt play. Therefore, the only source of compiled golf scores for all tournament players
is RTSS. Likewise, the only physical location at which to obtain compiled golf scores is the media
center."). As the court noted, "PGA agreed that once the golf scores are posted on its website,
they are in the public domain." Id. at 1291 n.2 (11th Cir. 2004).
70. Morris Commc'n v. PGA Tour, Inc., 364 F.3d 1288, 1293 n.6-9 (11th Cir. 2004) (agreeing
that "facts such as golf scores" are not protectable by copyright, but explaining that this is not a
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interest in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.7 1 ) in a bas-
ketball or football tournament sponsored by a state actor. 7 2
IV. EQUAL ACCESS RIGHTS OF THE MEDIA TO PUBLIC EVENTS
In order to evaluate credential agreements, it is helpful to consider
what occurs if a journalist does not want to abide by an agreement.
First, the journalist might decline to sign the agreement, which would
then lead to the question of whether or not the state actor has a right
to deny access to a journalist covering a public event.73 Second, the
media might violate the media policies of an association and then be
later denied access, as was the case in Illinois,74 or be sued for violat-
ing the terms, as happened in Wisconsin.75
A. Equal Access and Journalists
While it is generally relevant to know that the media has access
rights to areas traditionally open to the public and the media has at
least as great of a right to access as the general public,76 what is more
copyright case, but rather an anti-trust case and that PGA counsel, when asked, stated that they
had no problem journalists disseminating the news of the game).
71. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
72. See, e.g., United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 725 (1990) (stating that while "[t]he
Government's ownership of property does not automatically open that property to the pub-
lic..... [t]he Government, even when acting in its proprietary capacity, does not enjoy absolute
freedom from First Amendment constraints, as does a private business.").
73. Jared Janes, Newspapers battle LHSAA in Hammond: Photographers walk out of Top 28,
Tini, ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.), February 27, 2007 at C1. ("At least four newspaper pho-
tographers were banned from taking pictures at the Ladies' Top 28 Tournament in Hammond
after they refused to sign a Louisiana High School Athletic Association consent form.").
74. Amended Complaint at 3, Ill. Press Ass'n v. Ill. High Sch. Ass'n, No. 07-CH-885, (Ill. 7th
Cir. Sangamon County Jan. 23, 2008) (explaining how IHSA excluded some Illinois newspapers
from events).
75. First Amended Complaint at 9, Wis. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n v. Gannett Co., No. 09-
cv-155-wmc, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55137 (W.D. Wis. June 3, 2010), appeal docketed, No 10-
2627 (7th Cir. July 7, 2010) (filing suit against a Wisconsin newspaper, its parent company and
the state newspaper association).
76. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (finding that there was a
First Amendment right to attend criminal trials); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972)
(acknowledging that "without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press
could be eviscerated."). It is often said that the First Amendment is not a guarantee of access, in
the sense that it does not provide the media access that goes beyond that of the general public.
See e.g. Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1 (1978) (finding that the press did not have a greater right
of access than the general public to prisons). For example, a federal court in Rhode Island found
that a photographer did not have a First Amendment right to unlimited access to rock concerts.
See D'Amario v. Providence Civic Ctr. Auth., 639 F. Supp. 1538, 1543 (D.R.I. 1986). As that
court said, "the press cannot command access wherever, whenever and however it pleases," ad-
ding that it is also true that the government cannot "arbitrarily shroud genuinely newsworthy
events in secrecy." Id. Ultimately, the government's right to restrict First Amendment activity
depends in part on the type of place involved. For the purposes of the First Amendment, a
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important in these cases is whether conditions can be imposed on the
coverage that flows from that access and whether the state actor can
selectively allow access based on financial arrangements.
The First Amendment is a ban on government restrictions, not a
command for government action and access cases are treated differ-
ently than straight speech cases.77 While the U.S. Supreme Court has
developed a clear approach to cases involving restrictions on speech in
public places - usually by designating the level of public forums and
applying time, place, and manner tests - there is no similar frame-
work for cases involving access.78 Typically, a state actor may not deny
access to one member of the media while granting access to another
(the other journalist might be one who has signed the agreement, or
might be the official photographer or television station). 79 Ultimately,
location could be a "traditional" public forum, a "designated" public forum or a "nonpublic"
forum. See Whiteland Woods, L.P. v. Twp. of W. Whiteland, 193 F.3d 177, 182 n.2 (3d Cir. 1999)
(distinguishing between the different "fora" of speech). The court in Whiteland Woods
explained:
The government's ability to restrict speech is limited in speech fora. The Court has
identified three types of fora: the traditional public forum, the public forum created by
government designation, and the nonpublic forum. Traditional public fora are defined
by the objective characteristics of the property, such as whether, by long tradition or by
government fiat, the property has been devoted to assembly and debate.... Designated
public fora, in contrast, are created by purposeful governmental action. The govern-
ment does not create a designated public forum by inaction or by permitting limited
discourse, but only by intentionally opening a nontraditional public forum for public
discourse... . Other government properties are either nonpublic fora or not fora at all.
Id. Whiteland Woods held that a municipal government did not violate the First Amendment by
prohibiting videotaping of public meetings. Id. at 184. However, the ruling in Whiteland Woods
distinguished the case from others where videotaping was traditionally permitted and yet other
cases where state access laws were violated. Id When bringing a cause of action regarding ac-
cess, it is important to consider state access laws and open meetings laws in addition to the First
Amendment because some states' open meetings laws exceed the limited framework of the First
Amendment, particularly regarding access. See Csorny v. Shoreham-Wading River Cent. Sch.
Dist., 305 A.D.2d 83, 91 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (finding that although a ban on videotaping
public meetings did not violate the First Amendment, it did violate the state's open meetings law
since there was "no legitimate reason to prohibit [video cameras] from public meeting rooms of
school boards.").
77. See Gaubert v. Denton, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8207 (E.D. La. May 28, 1999) ("At the
outset, it is important to note that the First Amendment reads in the negative"); see also U.S.
CONs-r. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law .. , abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press").
78. See S.H.A.R.K. v. Metro Parks Serving Summit County, 499 F.3d 553, 559 (6th Cir. 2007)
("access cases ... have developed along distinctly different lines than have freedom of expres-
sion cases . . . . Although the Supreme Court has established general principles with respect to
access claims, what is missing from these cases is a clearly defined framework in which to analyze
these claims.").
79. The First Amendment protects expressive communication when it involves "an intent to
convey a particularized message" and a "likelihood was great that the message would be under-
stood by those who viewed it." See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989). In the case of an
official event photographer, that photographer is communicating a message to the parents who
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the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the notion that the
press has at least the same access rights as the general public.80 Of
course, the right of access does not automatically equal the right to
make photographs or videotape,8' but even if the government had the
discretion to close sporting events to photographers entirely, they may
not exclude some members of the media while allowing others.8 2 Once
the government creates a public forum, there is an equal right of ac-
cess, and access to a class of speakers cannot be restricted without a
bought the photographs. It seems clear that a photograph of an event would convey a memory
for a child who participated in that event, or information about the event to a parent who could
not attend. Thus the association would be discriminating between the "official" photographer
who has paid for access and the photographer who has not. Cf Telemundo of L.A. v. City of
L.A., 283 F. Supp. 2d 1095 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (finding that the city could not provide discrimina-
tory access, between the "official" television station and another television station, to an official
city event).
80. In a 4 to 3 decision, a divided court found that the media did not have a First Amendment
right, beyond that of the general public, to access the jai,1s in Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1
(1978). The plurality agreed that the First Amendment did not guarantee the public a right of
access to government sources. Id. at 15. But in a concurrence, Justice Stewart found that there
was a constitutional need to be flexible with the level of access accorded to the media as com-
pared to the public in general. Id at 16-17. Three dissenting justices found that media access to
the prison system was required by the First Amendment, particularly since there was no alterna-
tive way to learn truthful information about the conditions of the jails. Id. at 19-20. Thus a
majority of that Court actually felt that the media was due a greater level of access than they
were given. Just a couple of years later the Court overwhelmingly ruled in favor of access to
criminal trials. Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980). Many district and circuit
court cases addressing access rely on statements made in Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448
U.S. 555 (1980), a case which found that the media had a right of access to the courts, and
KQED. However, it is critical to any analysis of access to recognize that both opinions were
divided opinions, with plurality decisions in which only seven members of the court participated.
See generally Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980); Houchins v. KQED, 438
U.S. 1 (1978).
81. See generally Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1 (1978) (declining to find a right to videotape
the prison system); Whiteland Woods, L.P. v. Twp. of W. Whiteland, 193 F.3d 177, 184 (3d Cir.
1999) (finding that the "right of access to Planning Commission meetings did not create a federal
constitutional right to videotape the meetings"); D'Amario v. Providence Civic Ctr. Auth., 639 F.
Supp. 1538, (D.R.I. 1986) (finding no right to photograph concerts in city facility); Johnson v.
Adams, 629 F. Supp. 1563, 1564 (E.D. Tex. 1986) (finding that the Titus County Commissioners
Court had a right to ban videotaping of its meetings, and that such a ban did not violate the First
Amendment).
82. See Am. Broad. Cos. v. Cuomo, 570 F.2d 1080, 1083 (2d Cir. 1977) ("[O]nce the press is
invited ... there is a dedication of those premises to public communications use .... The issue is
not whether the public is or is not generally excluded, but whether the members of the broadcast
media are generally excluded."); Sherrill v. Knight, 569 F.2d 124, 129 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (finding
that once access to White House press facilities was opened to the media, access could not be
denied arbitrarily); Stevens v. N.Y. Racing Ass'n, 665 F. Supp. 164, 175 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) ("When
some members of the press are given access to cover an event, the state cannot arbitrarily im-
pose limits on other press representatives' access to the news."); Lewis v. Baxley, 368 F. Supp.
768, 779 (M.D. Ala. 1973) (finding that applying an ethics statute to the media was unconstitu-
tional on its face).
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compelling interest.83 It is important to note that a typical public fo-
rum analysis is not the sole analysis for these cases because the goal is
not to restrict speech within the forum, rather the goal of the journal-
ists is to speak outside of the forum about events that took place
within that forum.
Rulings declaring that once the government invites the media and
the public, they cannot deny access to specific members of the media,
or provide preferential access to media favorites84 are a hybrid of First
Amendment and Equal Protection principles.85 The Supreme Court
has not specifically dealt with equal access cases involving the media,
but in Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n,86 the
Court ruled that equal access in a public forum is a constitutional
right, and "the State must demonstrate compelling reasons for re-
stricting access to a single class of speakers, a single viewpoint, or a
single subject."87 Lower courts have clearly and strongly applied
Equal Access principles to the media.88
83. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 55 (1983). (noting, "In a
public forum, by definition, all parties have a constitutional right of access and the State must
demonstrate compelling reasons for restricting access to a single class of speakers, a single view-
point, or a single subject."); see also Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461-62 (1980) ("When gov-
ernment regulation discriminates among speech-related activities in a public forum, the Equal
Protection Clause mandates that the legislation be finely tailored to serve substantial state inter-
ests, and the justifications offered for any distinctions it draws must be carefully scrutinized.").
84. See, e.g., Am. Broad. Cos. v. Cuomo, 570 F.2d 1080, 1083 (2d Cir. 1977) (finding that once
access was opened to some media, it must be granted to all media); Stevens v. N.Y. Racing
Ass'n, 665 F. Supp. 164, 177 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (enjoining racing association from keeping maga-
zine photographer from paddock area of racing facility); Sherrill v. Knight, 569 F.2d 124 (D.C.
Cir. 1977) (ruling that the White House could not arbitrarily discriminate allowing access to
White House press facilities).
85. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461-62 (1980) ("When government regulation discrimi-
nates among speech-related activities in a public forum, the Equal Protection Clause mandates
that the legislation be finely tailored to serve substantial state interests, and the justifications
offered for any distinctions it draws must be carefully scrutinized."); see also Times-Picayune
Publ'g. Corp. v. Lee, No. 88-1325, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3506 at *25-28 (E.D. La. Apr. 15,
1988) (finding that a sheriff's policy of providing different levels of access to different news
organizations was unconstitutional); Borreca v. Fasi, 369 F. Supp. 906, 911 (D. Haw. 1974)
(prohibiting the mayor of Honolulu from excluding a certain reporter from his press confer-
ences); Telemundo of L.A. v. City of L.A., 283 F. Supp. 2d 1095,1103-04 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (decid-
ing in an equal protection claim that the city of Los Angeles could not form an exclusive
partnership with Univision which forced Telemundo to delay its broadcast of the city's official El
Grito ceremony); Stevens v. N.Y. Racing Ass'n, 665 F. Supp. 164, 176 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (finding
that even if discrimination against photographer was content neutral, it likely violated equal
protection).
86. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
87. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 55 (1983).
88. Times-Picayune Publ'g. Corp. v. Lee, No. 88-1325, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3506 at *25-28
(E.D. La. Apr. 15, 1988) (requiring a sheriff to provide equal access); Am. Broad. Cos. v.
Cuomo, 570 F.2d 1080, 1083 (2d Cir. 1977) (requiring a political candidate to allow equal access);
Telemundo of L.A. v. City of L.A., 283 F. Supp. 2d 1095, 1103 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (requiring the
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When a sheriff discriminated against a newspaper based on the be-
lief that it had made a factual error, a federal court in Louisiana found
it unconstitutional, stating: "The selective denial of access to a govern-
mental forum based on content is unconstitutional regardless of
whether a public forum is involved unless the government can show a
compelling state interest [that] is the least restrictive means available
to achieve the asserted governmental purpose." 89 The goal of encour-
aging accurate reporting or objectivity was not enough of a compelling
state interest to make the sheriff's actions constitutional, particularly
because he was seeking to control what was said about his own
actions. 90
Similarly, a federal district court in New York found that "once the
press [was] invited" to a campaign event (even though it was on pri-
vate property) "there [was] a dedication of those premises to public
communications use," and mayoral candidates Andrew Cuomo and
Ed Koch could not exclude one television station while inviting
others.91 Likewise, a court in Hawaii granted a preliminary injunction
to a reporter after the Honolulu mayor had repeatedly excluded him
from press conferences. 92
In Sherrill v. Knight,93 the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit found that when the White House volun-
tarily chose to open press facilities to the media, access could not be
denied arbitrarily unless there was a compelling reason. 94 In other
city of Los Angeles to provide equal access). But see Wis. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n v. Gan-
nett Co., No. 09-cv-155-wmc, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55137 (W.D. Wis. June 3, 2010), appeal
docketed, No 10-2627 (7th Cir. July 7, 2010) (finding that the WIAA did not have to provide
equal access to members of the media who wanted to stream video over the internet, in part
because of a finding of proprietary activity).
89. Times-Picayune Publ'g. Corp. v. Lee, No. 88-1325, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3506 at *26
(E.D. La. Apr. 15, 1988).
90. Id. at *21 ("[t]here is no compelling governmental interest in insuring that the information
reported . . . conforms to [the government official's] own conception of accuracy"). The court
went on to state that the sheriff's sought "to promote an interest with which the government may
not concern itself at all - control by an official of what is said and written about him. This is the
essence of censorship forbidden by the First Amendment and so abhorred by the founding fa-
thers." Id. at *26.
91. See Am. Broad. Cos. v. Cuomo, 570 F.2d 1080, 1083 (2d Cir. 1977) (finding that excluding
a television station from campaign activities based on their labor dispute violated the First
Amendment Rights of the television station, and issuing an injunction banning the arrest for
trespassing of reporters who crossed a picket line).
92. Borreca v. Fasi, 369 F. Supp. 906, 911 (D. Haw. 1974) (granting a preliminary injunction
against the mayor of Honolulu and blocking his practice of from excluding a reporter from his
press conferences).
93. 569 F.2d 124 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
94. Sherrill v. Knight, 569 F.2d 124 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ("White House press facilities having
been made publicly available as a source of information for newsmen, the protection afforded
newsgathering under the [F]irst [A]mendment guarantee of freedom of the press, requires that
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words, because they had opened up the White House press facilities to
members of the press, the government could not arbitrarily deny ac-
cess to some members of the press without providing them due pro-
cess, even when the security of the president was the stated reason
behind the denial.95 In Sherrill the White House granted media access
beyond that of the general public, just like the school sports associa-
tions in the contemporary cases at issue. It was in fact allowable for
the government in Sherrill to discriminate on the basis of the security
of the president, by any account a compelling interest,96 but merely
stating that journalist Robert Sherrill was excluded for "reasons of
security" was vague and impermissible. 97 Due process required that
the secret service provide a factual basis for denial, an opportunity to
respond and a final statement of the reasons for denial. 98
A federal court in California found that the City of Los Angeles
could not exclude the Spanish-language television station Telemundo
from the city's official El Grito ceremony when it had made an exclu-
sive deal with competing Spanish-language station Univision.99
Turning again to the facts of photographing a sporting event, if the
government permits access to one news organization because of an
agreement or deal, but denies access to another news organization be-
cause of the refusal to make that agreement, there is likely to be a
hybrid First Amendment/Equal Protection violation. The government
may in fact deny access to one journalist while allowing it to another,
but not if the exclusion is arbitrary,100 or impermissibly content-
based. 01 This concept is also supported by United States v.
this access not be denied arbitrarily or for less than compelling reasons." (citing Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972) and Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 829-35 (1974))).
95. Sherrill v. Knight, 569 F.2d 124 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (ruling that the White House could not
arbitrarily discriminate allowing access to White House press facilities).
96. Id. at 130 ("Clearly, protection of the [p]resident is a compelling, 'even an overwhelming,'
interest").
97. Id. ("we think that the phrase 'reasons of security' is unnecessarily vague and subject to
ambiguous interpretation.").
98. Id. at 131 (noting that due process was required in denying a First Amendment right,
evaluating "what process was due").
99. See Telemundo of L.A. v. City of L.A., 283 F. Supp. 2d 1095, 1103 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (find-
ing that the city of Los Angeles could not form an exclusive partnership with Univision which
forced Telemundo to delay its broadcast of the city's official El Grito ceremony).
100. See Sherrill v. Knight, 569 F.2d 124, 131 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ("notice to the unsuccessful
applicant of the factual bases for denial with an opportunity to rebut is a minimum prerequisite
for ensuring that the denial is indeed in furtherance of Presidential protection, rather than based
on arbitrary or less than compelling reasons").
101. See, e.g. Times-Picayune Publ'g. Corp. v. Lee, No. 88-1325, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3506
at *25 (E.D. La. Apr. 15, 1988) ("A policy that discriminates against particular reporters or news
organizations by public officials who are dissatisfied with the contents of news coverage is un-
constitutional unless the policy furthers a compelling state interest and is the least restrictive
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Kokinda,102 in which the Supreme Court held that while the govern-
ment has some proprietary right over public property, it does not have
the same right to limit First Amendment access that a private property
owner would. 103
In a closely on-point case, after a state racing association, which was
found to be a state actor, 1 0 4 opened an area to the press, it could not
restrict the access of a journalist because the association disliked the
content of that journalist's publication. 05 The court held: "When
some members of the press are given access to cover an event, the
state cannot arbitrarily impose limits on other press representatives'
access to the news."1 06
The Telemundo case is also very instructive. In that situation, the
city of Los Angeles sponsored an official ceremony on the eve of
Mexican Independence Day, marked by a cry known as El Grito.107
For twenty-two years, the city had an exclusive partnership with tele-
vision station KMEX-TV (KMEX), a Univision station, in relation to
the event.108 In 2003, KMEX planned to produce forty-five minutes of
entertainment, and then the official city El Grito re-enactment was to
take place.109 The city gave exclusive access to the event, which was
on public property, to KMEX. KMEX, in turn, planned to provide a
pool feed"o to other television stations, with the condition that they
embargo the footage until KMEX broadcast it. The broadcast was not
means available to achieve the asserted governmental purpose."); Stevens v. N.Y. Racing Ass'n,
665 F. Supp. 164, 168 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (finding that it was likely that the plaintiff could prove
that the discrimination was content-based, and granting an injunction against discrimination).
102. 497 U.S. 720 (1990).
103. See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 725 (1990) ("The Government's ownership of
property does not automatically open that property to the public . .. .t]he Government, even
when acting in its proprietary capacity, does not enjoy absolute freedom from First Amendment
constraints, as does a private business.").
104. Stevens v. N.Y. Racing Ass'n, 665 F. Supp. 164, 172 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) ("[Ilt is likely that
plaintiff will establish state action under the symbiotic relationship test at trial.").
105. Id. at 175 ("[T]he [F]irst [A]mendment prohibits government from restricting a journal-
ist's access to areas otherwise open to the press based upon the content of the journalist's
publications.").
106. Id.
107. Tlemundo of L.A.. City of L.A., 283 F. Supp. 2d 1095, 1097 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
108. In effect, KMEX was the "official" station of the ceremony. Id. at 1098.
109. Id.
110. A "pool" coverage arrangement is an agreement among members of the media to share
source material, whether video feed, photographs or notes. Pool coverage arrangements are typi-
cally used when the number of journalists interested in an event exceeds the space available,
such as in a courtroom or political debate. See generally Estate of Rosenbaum v. City of New
York, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15908 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 1993); WPIX, Inc. v. League of Women
Voters, 595 F. Supp. 1484 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Cable News Network, Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 528 F.
Supp. 365 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
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live.' Telemundo of Los Angeles sought to cover the event itself,
rather than relying on the delayed pool feed, and the city wouldn't
permit it. 112 Granting an injunction against the city, a federal court
found that 1) the city-sponsored event was a public forum;113 2) the
city was not acting in a commercial or proprietary capacity with re-
spect to the official ceremony;114 3) there was no compelling (or
other) reason why one television station should be granted access over
the other;' 15 4) the sharing of "pool" footage was not enough to over-
come the First- Amendment harm done by denying access to
Telemundo;116 and 5) the commercial interests of KMEX did not out-
weigh the First Amendment interests of Telemundo." 7
B. Equal Access and Commercial Photographers
The dynamics change a bit if the photographer challenging the ac-
cess policy is considered a commercial photographer, without consid-
eration to First Amendment activity. The Fourth and Eleventh
Circuits have both ruled that public schools and universities have a
right to make exclusive contracts with commercial photographers to
the exclusion of other commercial photographers, but First Amend-
ment equal access issues were not at play in those cases." 8 In neither
111. Telemundo of L.A. v. City of L.A., 283 F. Supp. 2d 1095, 1098 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
112. Id. at 1098-99 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
113. Id. at 1102 (C.D. Cal. 2003) ("For at least three years, the entertainment and official
ceremony have taken place on government property, transforming publicly owned property into
a public forum for expressive activity.").
114. Id. (distinguishing the case from D'Amario v. Providence Civic Ctr. Auth., 639 F. Supp.
1538, (D.R.I. 1986) and Post Newsweek Stations-Conn., Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 510 F. Supp. 81
(D. Conn. 1981)). The court noted that the events in those cases were produced by private enti-
ties and were purely commercial while El Grito was sponsored by the city, funded in part by the
city and featured the mayor. Id. at 1099. The city had committed $95,000 to the event. Id.
115. Id. at 1103 ("Defendants have not presented one reason, compelling or otherwise, why
they initially decided that KMEX's cameras should be granted access to the official ceremony
while Telemundo should be required to use a pool feed.").
116. Id. (rejecting an argument that providing pool footage was sufficient to meet
Telemundo's First Amendment rights "because embodied in Telemundo's First Amendment
rights is its right to decide what to film, what to emphasize, and what images to relay to viewers.
Moreover, Defendants have not persuasively argued that pooling is necessary.").
117. Telemundo of L.A. v. City of L.A., 283 F. Supp. 2d 1095, 1104 (C.D. Cal. 2003). ("Fur-
thermore, KMEX's commercial interest in the production of the El Grito ceremony does not
outweigh Telemundo's First Amendment rights and the public interest in diversity of coverage of
newsworthy events."). The Telemundo court distinguished the case from WPIX, Inc. v. League of
Women Voters, 595 F. Supp. 1484 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) by noting that the plaintiff in WPIX never
requested access prior to filing suit, while Telemundo had been seeking access for over four
months. Telemundo of L.A. v. City of L.A., 283 F. Supp. 2d 1095, 1104 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
118. See Stephen Jay Photography, Ltd. v. Olan Mills, Inc., 903 F.2d 988 (4th Cir. 1990) (hold-
ing that an exclusive contract for commercial yearbook photographer was not an anti-trust viola-
tion); see also Foto USA, Inc. v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys., 141 F.3d 1032 (11th Cir. 1998)
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case did the agreement operate to exclude the news media from
events or have an impact on the rights of private individuals to make
their own photographs. 119 In Foto USA, Inc. v. Board of Regents of the
University System of Florida2 0 the Eleventh Circuit found that exclu-
sive contracts between public universities and graduation photogra-
phers were not improper, even though they prevented a third party
commercial photographer from photographing the graduations and
soliciting sales at the events.121 The judge in Foto USA addressed the
First Amendment, but Judge Hill was only presented with, and only
examined, the commercial speech of the photographer soliciting busi-
ness.12 2 The Foto USA court's First Amendment holding was not
based on photography as expressive activity, nor was it based on the
free speech or free press aspect of photography.123 Plaintiff Foto USA
made a claim based on its right to solicit "the sales of photographs"
but did not make a claim that the photography itself was protected
First Amendment activity.12 4 While holding against the photogra-
pher's right to solicit business during the graduation, the court recog-
nized that "the general public (parents and anyone else with an
invitation), the official photographers, and Foto are all permitted ac-
cess to university graduation ceremonies. All are permitted to take
photographs of the graduates."125 Thus, Foto USA does not stand for
the principle that a state actor can prohibit a news photographer from
taking photographs at a public event. Nor does it provide that a state
actor can restrict what a photographer does with images after they are
taken lawfully.
The Fourth Circuit case of Stephen Jay Photography, Ltd. V. Olan
Mills, Inc.,'12 6 an antitrust case, was brought by a commercial photog-
rapher as well, and the Fourth Circuit ruled that the photographer had
failed to show that competing commercial photographers engaged in
antitrust violations by paying school districts to be the "official pho-
(finding that an exclusive contract for commercial photography rights at a graduation ceremony
was not a First Amendment commercial speech violation and did not violate equal protection
rights).
119. Foto USA, Inc. v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys., 141 F.3d 1032, 1035 (11th Cir. 1998).
120. Id.
122. Id. (holding that an exclusive contract for commercial photography rights at a graduation
ceremony was not a First Amendment issue and did not violate equal protection rights).
123. Id. at 1034 (noting that Foto USA "asserts that the commercial act of soliciting the sale of
photographs it intends to create there is the expressive activity which is protected by the First
Amendment." (emphasis added)).
124. Id. at 1035 (noting that Foto claimed that it intended "to solicit graduates to sell its pho-
tographs, and it is this solicitation that is the critical and protected activity.").
125. Id.
126. 903 F.2d 988 (4th Cir. 1990).
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tographers."12 7 The First Amendment, however, was not addressed in
Stephen Jay Photography.12 8
In conclusion, the government clearly has some proprietary rights
to restrict access when public places are converted into private, com-
mercial use. The government also has a right to contract with photog-
raphers for commercial work if it doesn't impact the First Amendment
rights of others. But once the government creates a public forum, or
converts a private forum to a public one, it cannot restrict press ac-
cess. In particular, once the government opens up a forum to members
of the media, the government may not provide discriminatory access
to different members of the media without a compelling government
interest that is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. Based on the
Telemundo ruling, while a government actor can have an "official"
photographer, they cannot use that as a reason to exclude other
journalists.129
V. DOES THE GOVERNMENT HAVE A RIGHT TO IMPOSE
RESTRICTIONS ON THE MEDIA AS A CONDITION
OF ACCESS?
Participation in First Amendment activity is not a license to violate
a contract or to violate an otherwise constitutional law. 1 30 Therefore,
it would seem that a journalist who made a contract or signed a
credentialing agreement would be held to that contract.131 In Cohen v.
Cowles Media Co.,132 the Supreme Court ruled that the First Amend-
ment did not protect a reporter from the consequences of breaking an
agreement of confidentiality with a source who demanded anonymity
in exchange for information.133 When the newspaper revealed the
127. Stephen Jay Photography, Ltd. v. Olan Mills, Inc., 903 F.2d 988, 995 (4th Cir. 1990).
128. Even the issue of exclusive photography contracts by public schools was not fully reached
in Stephen Jay Photography because plaintiffs failed to meet the elements of restraint of trade
because they had made no effort to bid on becoming the official photographer and because the
schools did not prevent the plaintiff's photographs from being used in the student yearbook.
Stephen Jay Photography, Ltd. v. Olan Mills, Inc., 903 F.2d 988, 994-95 (4th Cir. 1990).
129. Telemundo of L.A. v. City of L.A., 283 F. Supp. 2d 1095, 1103 (C.D. Cal. 2003) ("embod-
ied in Telemundo's First Amendment rights is its right to decide what to film, what to emphasize,
and what images to relay to viewers. Moreover, Defendants have not persuasively argued that
pooling is necessary.").
130. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 670 (1991) (finding that a news organization
was subject to damages for violating a confidentiality contract, and "enforcement of such general
laws against the press is not subject to stricter scrutiny than would be applied to enforcement
against other persons or organizations.").
131. See generally Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 665-66.
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confidential source's name, the newspaper was liable for damages re-
sulting from the breach of the agreement. 134
However, Cohen is not entirely on point and does not end the anal-
ysis of what happens if a newspaper breaches a credentialing agree-
ment. An important distinction is that the confidential source in
Cohen was not a state actor. Although not specifically discussed in the
analysis of Cohen, the condition of anonymity was imposed by a pri-
vate individual in exchange for giving information that the individual
did not have a constitutional obligation to provide.135
In addition to a contract potentially being invalid if the terms were
impermissible government restrictions, a contract can be held invalid
for other reasons.136 For example, a contract based on fraudulent as-
sertions is voidable.137 It is therefore possible that if a journalist made
an agreement based on an assertion by an athletic association that the
association has exclusive rights to the facts or descriptions of the
game, the related elements of that agreement might be voidable as a
material misrepresentation, because no such right exists.138
Assuming for the sake of argument that an access agreement is not
void based on material misrepresentation, the questions remain
whether the restrictions are legitimate time, place, and manner restric-
tions; whether government can impose a fee on gathering news; and
whether restrictions can be imposed on the way that the media uses
information that the media gathers. The government does have the
ability to impose some restrictions and conditions on access, namely
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions.13 9 Time, place, and
manner restrictions are content neutral, narrowly tailored, and serve a
134. Id. at 672.
135. See generally Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991).
136. C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg. v. Major League Baseball Advanced, L.P., 505 F.3d 818, 825 (8th
Cir. 2007) (finding that a baseball company was not bound by certain terms of a prior contract
because Major League Baseball had falsely guaranteed that it was the sole and exclusive owner
of the rights and titles to baseball players names and statistics, when in fact the league did not
have exclusive ownership of such. A lower court had differently found that enforcement of the
terms would have violated public policy).
137. See, e.g., REiAsrATEMLNr (SECOND) OF CONRACoIs, § 164(1) (1981) ("If a party's manifes-
tation of assent is induced by either a fraudulent or a material misrepresentation by the other
party upon wilh tihe iecipient is justified in relying, the contract is voidable by the recipient.").
138. See id.; see also C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg. v. Major League Baseball Advanced, L.P., 505
F.3d 818, 825 (8th Cir. 2007) (finding that a baseball company was not bound by certain terms of
a prior contract because Major League Baseball had falsely guaranteed that it was the sole and
exclusive owner of the rights and titles to baseball players names and statistics, when in fact the
league did not have exclusive ownership of such. A lower court had found that enforcement of
the terms would have violated public policy).
139. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) ("[E]ven in a public forum the
government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected
speech, provided the restrictions are justified without reference to the content of the regulated
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significant government interest. 140 In addition, the restrictions must
leave other channels of communication open.141
Plenty of restrictions on access by the media have been found ac-
ceptable by courts, such as requiring a background check to access the
White House press room; 42 requiring photographers to participate in
a media-regulated pool agreement when space is at a premium; 143 lim-
iting coverage-related conduct that is disruptive;144 and even limiting
photographic coverage to protect other fundamental rights such as the
right to a fair trial and the right to privacy.145 Importantly, none of the
above-listed restrictions involved what could be done with images or
information after it was legally gathered.
speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they
leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information.").
140. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 462 (1980) (explaining that discrimination "among speech-
related activities in a public forum, the Equal Protection Clause mandates that the legislation be
finely tailored to serve substantial state interests, and the justifications offered for any distinc-
tions it draws must be carefully scrutinized.").
141. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) ("[E]ven in a public forum the
government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected
speech, provided the restrictions are justified without reference to the content of the regulated
speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they
leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information.").
142. Sherrill v. Knight, 569 F.2d 124, 130 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ("Clearly, protection of the
[piresident is a compelling, 'even an overwhelming,' interest").
143. WPIX, Inc. v. League of Women Voters, 595 F. Supp. 1484, 1490 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (deny-
ing a preliminary injunction to force the League of Women Voters to allow access to WPIX by
concluding that it would not be fair or workable).
144. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 551 (1965); see also Johnson v. Adams, 629 F. Supp.
1563, 1564 (E.D. Tex. 1986) (finding that the Titus County Commissioners Court had a right to
ban videotaping of its meetings, and that such a ban did not violate the First Amendment). The
court in Titus County noted that the United States Senate and House of Representatives had
also banned videotaping, which is no longer the case. Id. at 1564-65. This is easily distinguishable
from a sporting event because the disruptive nature of cameras is not an issue, as evidenced by
the presence of official photographers.
145. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 551 (1965) (finding that an unruly courtroom, including
the uncontrolled presence of cameras, violated the defendant's right to a fair trial); see also In re
Miss. Rules for Elec. & Photographic Coverage of Judicial Proceedings, No. 89-R-99031, 2003
Miss. LEXIS 184, at *5 (April 11, 2003) ("Coverage of certain persons prohibited. Electronic
coverage of the following categories of witnesses is expressly prohibited: police informants, mi-
nors, undercover agents, relocated witnesses, victims and families of victims of sex crimes, and
victims of domestic abuse.") It is possible that the Mississippi rules would not be upheld. They
are not narrowly tailored because their broad nature excludes coverage of jurors and sex crime
victims that consent to electronic coverage. See e.g., Fla. Star v. B. J. F., 491 U.S. 524, 539 (1989)
(finding a statute unconstitutional when it made it illegal to publish the names of victims of
sexual offenses "regardless of whether the identity of the victim is already known throughout the
community; whether the victim has voluntarily called public attention to the offense; or whether
the identity of the victim has otherwise become a reasonable subject of public concern."); see
also Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Toole, 463 U.S. 1303, 1306 (1983) (noting that a ban on publish-
ing names of jurors was not narrowly tailored, even if it were to serve a compelling state interest,
which had not been proven).
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The government can also restrict access to publicly-owned facilities
that are leased by private entities without running afoul of the First
Amendment because of the governmental need to protect its proprie-
tary interest and compete in the marketplace with other facilities. 146
While some restrictions on coverage are clearly acceptable when
there is a compelling government interest, such as the safety of the
president, 147 Some conditions, such as requiring a news organization to
pay a licensing fee, strike at the heart of our nation's historical aboli-
tion of prior restraint.148
There are clearly good reasons why the associations are imposing
these restrictions, but the question is not whether there is an impor-
tant purpose, as the Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Association
claims its fee serves. 149 Because this is a direct, rather than incidental
restriction on speech, if the restrictions are to be upheld, the question
that must be asked is whether the stated interests that the associations
have is in fact a compelling interest, 50 and whether the restrictions are
narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.15 Most of the interests as-
serted and implied in the cases involving athletic associations are not
146. See Post Newsweek Stations-Conn., Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 510 F. Supp. 81, 86 (D.
Conn. 1981) (finding that restricting access to a publicly owned sports arena was not unconstitu-
tional when it was rented out to a private entity and the city was operating in its proprietary
capacity); D'Amario v. Providence Civic Ctr. Auth., 639 F. Supp. 1538, 1544 (D.R.I. 1986) (find-
ing that private concert promoters did not have to allow a photographer access simply because
the facility was owned by the city).
147. See Sherrill v. Knight, 569 F.2d 124, 130 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ("Clearly, protection of the
[p]resident is a compelling, 'even an overwhelming,' interest.").
148. See RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDME7NT CASE;S AND THE-
ojl, 406 (Aspen Publishers 2008) (explaining how "[tihe classic prior restraint is a licensing law
- a law that forbids a person from publishing his ideas without first receiving the permission, or
'license' of a government official.").
149. See First Amended Complaint at 7-8, Wis. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n v. Gannett Co.,
No. 09-cv-155-wmc, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55137 (W.D. Wis. June 3, 2010), appeal docketed, No
10-2627 (7th Cir. July 7, 2010) ("Fees generated ... serve the important purpose of generating
revenue for the WIAA.") (emphasis added).
150. See Ark. Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 228 (1987) (finding that discrimi-
nating among news organizations (based on content) must be "necessary to serve a compelling
state interest" and "narrowly drawn to achieve that end."); see also Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry
Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 55 (1983) (holding that "the State must demonstrate com-
pciiing reasos for restricting access tu a siigi class uf speakeis, a singie viewpoint, or a single
subject."); Sherrill v. Knight, 569 F.2d 124 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (granting that when the White House
voluntarily chose to open a facility to the media, access could not be denied arbitrarily unless
there was a compelling reason).
151. See Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Toole, 463 U.S. 1303, 1306 (1983) (noting that a ban on
publishing names of jurors was not narrowly tailored, even if it were to serve a compelling state
interest, which had not been proven); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)
("[E]ven in a public forum the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time,
place, or manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions are justified without reference to
the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant govern-
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compelling enough to justify the restraint on the media. 15 2 In fact, the
majority of these interests have been explicitly rejected by Supreme
Court precedent. In Miami Herald Publishing Co., Division of Knight
Newspapers, Inc. v. Tornillo,153 the Supreme Court found that a desire
for fair and accurate reporting was not a compelling government in-
terest.154 In Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland,'55 the Court
reminded us that "an interest in raising revenue, 'standing
alone,. . .cannot justify the special treatment of the press, for an alter-
native means of achieving the same interest without raising concerns
under the First Amendment is clearly available."' 1 5 6 Finally, in Wilson
v. Layne,157 the Supreme Court, ruling on a Fourth Amendment issue,
found that public relations did not justify the violation of a fundamen-
tal right, in that case, a right to privacy.158
mental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the
information.").
152. See generally First Amended Complaint at 7-8, Wis. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n v.
Gannett Co., No. 09-cv-155-wmc, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55137 (W.D. Wis. June 3, 2010), appeal
docketed, No 10-2627 (7th Cir. July 7, 2010). ("Fees generated through the granting of transmis-
sion and broadcast licenses, including over the Internet, serve the important purpose of generat-
ing revenue for the WIAA."); Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint at 2-4, Ill. Press Ass'n v.
Ill. High Sch. Ass'n, No. 07-CH-885, (111. 7th Cir. Sangamon County Dec. 5, 2007) (explaining
the reasons for entering into an exclusive agreement, the reasons included a need for photo-
graphs to promote the activities of the association and a desire to save money which it previously
spent hiring its own photographer).
153. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
154. Miami Herald Pub. Co., Div. of Knight Newspapers, Inc. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256
(1974) (finding that "[a] responsible press is an undoubtedly desirable goal, but press responsi-
bility is not mandated by the Constitution and like many other virtues it cannot be legislated.").
155. 481 U.S. 221 (1987).
156. Ark. Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 232 (1987) (citing Minneapolis Star
& Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 586 (1983)). The Minneapolis Star
Court had explained that revenues could be raised by general taxes, in a way that did not single
out media and risk censorship. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm'r of Revenue,
460 U.S. 575, 586 (1983).
157. 526 U.S. 603 (1999).
158. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999) (finding that the actions of the police, when
they allowed the media to enter a private home while a warrant was being executed, violated the
Fourth Amendment. The court further found that the government goals of good public relations
and accurate reporting did not justify the violation of the fundamental right to privacy). Likewise
the goal of accurate publicity was rejected as a justification for violating the First Amendment
right of access in Tornillo. Miami Herald Pub. Co., Div. of Knight Newspapers, Inc. v. Tornillo,
418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974). See also Times-Picayune Publ'g. Corp. v. Lee, No. 88-1325, 1988 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 3506 at *26 (E.D. La. Apr. 15, 1988) ("Promoting the accuracy or objectivity of
news reporting is not a compelling governmental interest that justifies content-based discrimina-
tion against a news organization."); Borreca v. Fasi, 369 F. Supp. 906, 910-11 (D. Haw. 1974)
(noting that a government official attempts to use his office "to intimidate or to discipline the
press . . . because of what appears in print, a compelling governmental interest that cannot be
served by less restrictive means must be shown for such use to meet Constitutional standards. No
compelling governmental interest has been shown or even claimed here.").
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VI. A CLOSER LOOK AT THE WIAA CREDENTIALS
There are many examples of controversial restrictions imposed by
sports associations, but because the dispute in Wisconsin went to court
and many of the documents became public record, it presents the op-
portunity for a useful case study. This section will evaluate the legality
of several kinds of conditions.
A. Vague conditions
The 2008-2009 WIAA Media Policies included a provision that
rights would be granted in the case of television, cable and Internet
video "at the sole discretion of the rights holder."159 This level of dis-
cretion may be impermissibly vague. Conditions that leave too much
discretion for denying access are impermissible.16 0 As discussed
above, based on Sherrill, a state actor can exclude a journalist, but the
reasons must be specified, there must be a factual basis for denial, and
there must be an opportunity to respond.161 The unfettered discretion
argument was made by Gannett in its lawsuit with the WIAA, but it
was rejected by the district court in part because the court found that
the discretion had not been abused.162 Of course actual censorship is
not required to make a policy unconstitutional, rather it is the poten-
tial for censorship, which results in self-censorship, that makes a policy
invalid.163 In fact, "[p]roof of an abuse of power in the particular case
159. Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Association, 2008-09 Media Policies Reference Guide
at 10 (on file with author). Vagueness was also an issue in the IHSA case, where one of the
complaints was the vague prohibition on "secondary use." Amended Complaint at 3, 111. Press
Ass'n v. Ill. High Sch. Ass'n, No. 07-CH-885, (Ill. 7th Cir. Sangamon County Jan. 23, 2008).
160. See Sherrill v. Knight, 569 F.2d 124, 131 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (ruling that the White House
could not arbitrarily discriminate allowing access to White House press facilities.) While it was
permissible for the government in Sherrill to discriminate on the basis of the security of the
president, the standards by which the security risk is determined had to be published and stating
that a journalist was excluded for "reasons of security" was vague. Due process required that the
secret service provide a factual basis for denial, an opportunity to respond and a final statement
of the reasons for denial. Id.
161. Id. (ruling that when blocking a reporter from White House access, secret service must
provide a factual basis for denial, an opportunity to respond and a final statement of the reasons
for denial).
162. Wis. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n v. Gnuncuie Cu., No. 09-cv-155-wmc, 20i0 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 55137, at *71- (W.D. Wis. June 3, 2010), appeal docketed, No 10-2627 (7th Cir. July 7,
2010) (stating, "defendants have identified no reason to believe that, in the future, plaintiffs will
begin issuing licenses to media companies on the basis of viewpoint. . . In the event that defend-
ants are denied a license in the future for a reason that violates the First Amendment, they are
free to bring an as-applied challenge at that time.").
163. See Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Pub. Co., 486 U.S. 750, 757 (1988) ("[T]he mere existence
of the licensor's unfettered discretion, coupled with the power of prior restraint, intimidates
parties into censoring their own speech, even if the discretion and power are never actually
abused").
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has never been deemed a requisite for attack on the constitutionality
of a statute purporting to license the dissemination of ideas." 164
B. Requiring a licensing fee in exchange for allowing coverage
At the heart of the WIAA dispute was the group's television and
Internet policies requiring payment for the right to broadcast video,
information or photographs of the games in "real-time." 65 The
WIAA lawsuit was filed after a newspaper streamed a football game
live on the Internet without the payment of licensing fees.166 In addi-
tion, the pleadings reveal that the WIAA demanded similar licensing
fees for merely transmitting information - for example, by "live blog-
ging" - over the Internet during the game.167 The WIAA asserted no
compelling interest for these fees, other than the desire to earn reve-
nue.168 Despite this, the district court ruled that the licensing fees
were constitutional, stating that because the WIAA had decided to
make live coverage of the games a commercial effort, it was acting in a
proprietary capacity and not subject to strict scrutiny.169
The legal system's treatment of fees on the media has deep histori-
cal roots dating back to the origins of our system of freedom of the
press, which began in pre-colonial England. After the invention of the
printing press publishers were required to receive permission, in the
form of a license, in order to publish. The license could be rejected at
164. Id.
165. First Amended Complaint at 8-9, Wis. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n v. Gannett Co., No.
09-cv-155-wmc, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55137 (W.D. Wis. June 3, 2010), appeal docketed, No 10-
2627 (7th Cir. July 7, 2010).
166. Id.
167. First Amended Complaint at 7, Wis. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n v. Gannett Co., No.
09-cv-155-wme, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55137 (W.D. Wis. June 3, 2010), appeal docketed, No 10-
2627 (7th Cir. July 7, 2010) ("members of the media who seek to transmit the event itself,
whether live or tape delayed, must obtain a license from the WIAA or one of its contractual
partners, such as WWWY, and, if granted, must pay a reasonable license fee and agree to abide
by WIAA broadcast and media policies"); Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Association,
2008-09 Media Policies Reference Guide at 16 (on file with author) (outlining fees required for
broadcasting and "live blogging").
168. First Amended Complaint at 7-8, Wis. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n v. Gannett Co., No.
09-cv-155-wmc, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55137 (W.D. Wis. June 3, 2010), appeal docketed, No 10-
2627 (7th Cir. July 7, 2010) ("Fees generated through the granting of transmission and broadcast
licenses, including over the Internet, serve the important purpose of generating revenue for the
WIAA.").
169. Wis. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n v. Gannett Co., No. 09-cv-155-wmc, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 55137, at *32-33 (W.D. Wis. June 3, 2010), appeal docketed, No 10-2627 (7th Cir. July 7,
2010) ("WIAA invites the public to its members' games not for the purpose of fostering debate,
but in substantial part to make money.. . When the government acts in a commercial or proprie-
tary capacity, as WIAA does with respect to the tournament games it sponsors, it weighs
strongly against finding that the government has created a public forum or that regulation of
speech within that forum is subject to strict scrutiny.").
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will, and was used to censor or ban work that the government didn't
agree with.170 With this backdrop, it is easy to see how a requirement
to purchase a license in order to cover a government-sponsored event
might be found to be repulsive to the concept of free speech. When
combined with vague terms that give discretion to the government to
restrict publication entirely, there would be little to distinguish such
rules from printing-press era licensing and prior restraint. 171
Furthermore, a requirement by a state actor to pay for the privilege
of covering an event could be likened to a tax. While the government
is not prohibited from taxing the media in a manner similar to other
businesses, it is typically unconstitutional to create a tax that singles
out the press, or singles out certain publications. 1 7 2 In its pleadings,
the WIAA never asserts a particular cost associated with having addi-
tional media present; in other words, the fees are not directed at the
expenses involved in having the media present.'73 Rather, what is as-
serted is the "important interest" of raising revenue.174 Thus it ap-
pears that the WIAA is singling out the media to fund the operational
costs of its events. Even so, the WIAA court found that the fee was a
permissible fee.175
A tax or licensing requirement that is imposed only when news is
distributed in a certain way, such as when a publication broadcasts on
the Internet, or when a news organization runs footage for over two
minutes, is content-based, and the Supreme Court has explicitly re-
jected taxes on the media that are based on content.176
170. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713-14 (1931) (describing the struggle in England
against the licensing power to restrain publication prior to publication); see also Ronald J.
Krotoszynski, Jr., et al., TiiE FIRSr AMENDMENT CASES AN) THEORY 406-07 (Aspen Publishers
2008) (describing the origins of prior restraint and the rejection of prior restraint as a threat to
press freedom).
171. Cf Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (explaining the origins of prior restraint).
172. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 592-593
(1983) ("A tax that singles out the press, or that targets individual publications within the press,
places a heavy burden on the State to justify its action.").
173. First Amended Complaint, Wis. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n v. Gannett Co., No. 09-cv-
155-wmc, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55137 (W.D. Wis. June 3, 2010), appeal docketed, No 10-2627
(7th Cir. July 7, 2010).
174. Id. at 7-8 ("Fees geneiated dtough thc gianting of transmission and broadcast licenses,
including over the Internet, serve the important purpose of generating revenue for the WIAA.")
(emphasis added).
175. Id. at *32-33 (W.D. Wis. June 3, 2010) (finding that the purpose of the events was to
make money, the WIAA was acting in a proprietary capacity).
176. See Ark. Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 228 (1987) (finding that regard-
less of motivation, a tax that charged media organizations differently (based on content) was
unconstitutional. The fact that that the tax status of a publication was based on its content was
repugnant to the First Amendment and "an interest in raising revenue, standing alone ... cannot
justify the special treatment of the press, for an alternative means of achieving the same interest
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An evaluation of taxes on the media once brings us back to the
history of the First Amendment, as explained by the Supreme Court
in Grosjean v. American Press Co.' 77 After England abolished the
above-mentioned licensing system as a pre-condition for use of the
presses, there was a new effort to use taxes as a method of discrimi-
nating against criticisms of the crown.s78 As the Grosjean Court ex-
plained, "these taxes constituted one of the factors that aroused the
American colonists to protest against taxation for the purposes of the
home government; and that the revolution really began when, in 1765,
[the British] government sent stamps for newspaper duties to the
American colonies." 79 A stamp tax on newspapers and magazines by
colonial Massachusetts was also violently opposed. 80 Both were part
of the inspiration for the First Amendment.' 8 ' The Grosjean Court
went on to find that a tax, which had been imposed only on newspa-
pers below a certain circulation level, was unconstitutional.18 2
Nearly fifty years later, in Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minne-
sota Commissioner of Revenue, 83 the Court clarified that an illicit
censorship goal was not required to invalidate a tax that singles out
the media.184 All that is required is the potential for abuse from sin-
gling out the press. 85 Finally, in Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v.
Ragland, the Supreme Court found that a tax that charged media or-
ganizations differently based on the content of the publication was
unconstitutional. In that ruling, the Court asserted that "an interest in
raising revenue, standing alone. . .cannot justify the special treatment
of the press, for an alternative means of achieving the same interest
without raising concerns under the First Amendment is clearly available."); Minneapolis Star &
Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 592-593 (1983) (invalidating an ink tax
that only applied to certain types of publications); see also Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439,
445-47 (1991) (explaining the line of taxation of the press cases including Grosjean v. American
Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936), Minneapolis Star and Arkansas Ragland and noting that even
without an illicit or impermissible intent, a tax that singles out the media is presumptively uncon-
stitutional and is only permissible if there is a compelling justification).
177. 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
178. Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 246 (1936).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 248.
181. Id. at 248-49.
182. Id. at 251.
183. 460 U.S. 575, (1983).
184. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 592 (1983)
("[E]ven regulations aimed at proper governmental concerns can restrict unduly the exercise of
rights protected by the First Amendment.").
185. Id. at 591-593 (1983).
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without raising concerns under the First Amendment is clearly
available."' 86
As summarized in Leathers v. Medlock,187 this line of cases stands
for the principle that while the press is not immune from taxes and
fees shared by all businesses, a "differential taxation of First Amend-
ment speakers is constitutionally suspect when it threatens to suppress
the expression of particular ideas or viewpoints. Absent a compelling
justification, the government may not exercise its taxing power to sin-
gle out the press."188 By its nature, payment that is imposed only when
information is presented at a certain time or beyond a certain
length' 89 will operate to suppress the expression of that information.
C. Time limits on video and real-time reporting and live
broadcast limits
The WIAA credentialing restrictions include a two-minute time
limit on video coverage.190 Attempts to impose such time limits on
video usage in news broadcasts are becoming more and more common
at sporting events. On the college level, the controversial initial
2009-2010 media policies for the Southeastern Conference also in-
cluded a two-minute limit for use of video and limits on live blog-
ging.191 As mentioned above, the critical issue in the WIAA suit was
related to the broadcasting of an entire football game live over the
186. Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 228 (1987).
187. 499 U.S. 439 (1991).
188. Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 447 (1991).
189. First Amended Complaint at 7, Wis. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n v. Gannett Co., No.
09-cv-155-wmc, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55137 (W.D. Wis. June 3, 2010), appeal docketed, No 10-
2627 (7th Cir. July 7, 2010) ("reporting may include use of up to two minutes of taped footage of
any tournament event. However, members of the media who seek to transmit the event itself,
whether live or tape delayed, must obtain a license. . . and, if granted, must pay a reasonable
license fee"). See also Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Association, 2008-09 Media Policies
Reference Guide at 12 (on file with author) (prohibiting use of audio or video tape for longer
than two minutes and prohibiting the live coverage).
190. Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Association, 2008-09 Media Policies Reference Guide
at 12 (on file with author) ("The use of video, audio and tape exceeding two minutes by the
originating stations, publication or Web site for any purpose other than highlights on regularly
scheduled news or sports broadcasts, or on a Web page, is prohibited.").
191. See Joe Strupp, SEC Revises Controversial Credential Policy - Most Restrictions Lifted,
EDIJOR & PUBLISI HER, (Aug. 27, 2009) (on file with author) (describing initial terms of creden-
tial agreement for the Southeastern Conference which included restrictions on Web site video
and audio footage, limits on live blogging and required newspapers to grant the SEC and univer-
sities permission to use photographs taken at the games. After several news organizations
threatened to boycott the games, most of the restrictions were eased.) The Illinois High School
Athletic Association also imposed a 30-second-per-event limit for newscasts before a settlement
was reached with the newspapers. See Illinois High School Association, 2007-2008 Football State
Final Media Arrangements (on file with author).
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Internet.192 The WIAA ruling, which found that the broadcast was im-
proper and could be restricted, creates the precedent that a state actor
can in fact place limits on the length of coverage and restrictions on
the timing of coverage of that state actor and the events it sponsors.'93
Time limits on video and restrictions on live blogging should both
be considered under the concepts of prior restraint and interference
with editorial discretion. By their nature, they impose a limit on the
reporting of a news organization, and prevent reporting of a certain
type (that which may be more than two minutes in length, or that
which may be about events that are occurring at the time of the re-
port). In Near v. Minnesota,'94 the Supreme Court, in finding a Minne-
sota statute unconstitutional, held that prior restraint on publication
was an infringement of the freedom of the press,195 and explained that
the cornerstone of a free press was the absence of prior restraint.196
The repulsion of prior restraint was re-affirmed forty years later in
New York Times Co. v. United States,'97 (known as the Pentagon Pa-
pers case) when the Court stated outright that "[a]ny system of prior
restraints of expression comes to this court bearing a heavy presump-
tion against its constitutional validity." 98 In the Pentagon Papers case,
the government asserted an interest in preventing the publication of
the contents of classified documents, surely an interest far higher than
raising revenue for a sporting event. 99
In addition to serving as a prior restraint on publication, the time-
limit restrictions on video reports and real-time reporting invade the
editorial decision-making process. If a news organization finds a par-
ticular game worthy of more than two minutes of coverage, the re-
strictions would prohibit such a report. Such restrictions on the scope
of a news report were explicitly rejected in Tornillo when the Supreme
192. First Amended Complaint at 8-9, Wis. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n v. Gannett Co., No.
09-cv-155-wmc, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55137 (W.D. Wis. June 3, 2010), appeal docketed, No 10-
2627 (7th Cir. July 7, 2010).
193. Wis. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n v. Gannett Co., No. 09-cv-155-wmc, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 55137, at *58, *60 (W.D. Wis. June 3, 2010), appeal docketed, No 10-2627 (7th Cir. July 7,
2010) ("In fact, the license. . . simply prohibits them from filming and transmitting the game
live... Defendants are free to publish accounts of the tournaments in newspapers and television,
to interview the players and coaches and even to display up to two minutes of live video cover-
age of any game.")
194. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
195. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 723 (1931) ("[W]e hold the statute ... to be an infringc-
ment of the liberty of the press guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.").
196. Id. at 714-719.
197. 403 U.S. 713, (1971).
198. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971).
199. Id. ("Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this court bearing a heavy
presumption against its constitutional validity. . . the government [has] not met that burden.").
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Court said that decisions about limitations on the "size and content"
of a report constituted the "exercise of editorial control and judg-
ment," and that regulation of this process by the government is incon-
sistent with the First Amendment. 200
D. Restrictions on the sale of reprints
The WIAA credentials state that "[any sale of photography, digital
image files, videotape or film taken at State Tournament Series events
is prohibited without written consent of the WIAA." 2 0 1 The right of
newspapers to sell reprints has yet to be ruled on by a judge. It was at
the heart of the dispute between the Illinois newspapers and the Illi-
nois High School Association (IHSA) in Illinois Press Ass'n v. Illinois
High Sch. Ass'n, but that case settled before reaching a court of
law.2 0 2 In the WIAA case, the court did not rule on the reprint
issue.203
The athletic associations appear to be of the opinion that the sale of
reprints is not a First Amendment activity.2 0 4 But as explained below,
the sale of photographic prints can be considered First Amendment
activity, particularly when it is done in connection with other First
Amendment activity. Exerting control over what happens to images
after they are obtained goes far beyond time, place, and manner re-
strictions that regulate behavior during the newsgathering process.
200. Miami Herald Pub. Co., Div. of Knight Newspapers, Inc. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258
(1974).
201. Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Association, 2008-09 Media Policies Reference Guide
at 6 (on file with author).
202. Amended Complaint at 3-6, Ill. Press Ass'n v. Ill. High Sch. Ass'n, No. 07-CH-885 (Ill.
7th Cir. Sangamon County Jan. 23, 2008); IllinoisPress.org, Joint IPA/IHSA Statement, http://
illinoispress.org/index.php?view=article&catid=27%3Agovernment-news&id=156%3Aipaihsa-
statement&format=pdf&option=com-content&Itemid=165 (last visited September 27, 2010).
203. See Wis. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n v. Gannett Co., No. 09-cv-155-wmc, 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 55137, at *22 (W.D. Wis. June 3, 2010), appeal docketed, No 10-2627 (7th Cir. July 7,
2010) ("defendants say nothing in their briefs about the photography policy. In light of this
silence and the parties' stipulation to drop Visual Image Photography as a party (dkt. # 6), de-
fendants have effectively abandoned their challenge to that policy.").
204. See First Amended Complaint at 10, Wis. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n v. Gannett Co.,
No. 09-cv-155-wmc, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55137 (W.D. Wis. June 3, 2010), appeal docketed, No
10-2627 (7th Cir. July 7, 2010) ("WIAA's media policies do not restrict the ability of Defendants
to report on the games in their newspapers or on their Internet sites."); Counterclaim and Third-
Party Complaint at 4, Ill. Press Ass'n v. Ill. High Sch. Ass'n, No. 07-CH-885, (Ill. 7th Cir. Sanga-
mon County Dec. 5, 2007) (explaining the IHSA's belief that the IHSA's agreement with a
commercial photographer does not prohibit the IHSA from allowing the media from accessing
or photographing the event, but it does prevent the IHSA from allowing photographers who
have the intent to sell photos from entering an event).
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E. Requirements to include certain advertising in broadcasts
The 2008-2009 WIAA Media Policies includes a policy that "The
WIAA reserves the right to require two minutes of advertising or pro-
motional inventory to be included in any or all radio or television
broadcasts, as well as Webcasts of WIAA Tournament Series events as
determined by the WIAA."205 The Supreme Court ruled in Tornillo
that an attempt to compel a newspaper to include certain elements in
its publication was a Constitutional violation, 206 noting that "[tihe
choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions made as
to limitations on the size and content of the paper, and treatment of
public issues and public officials - whether fair or unfair - consti-
tute the exercise of editorial control and judgment," 207 and could not
be regulated. 208
F. Summary of the WIAA credential
Despite the fact that the WIAA court found some conditions and
restrictions in the WIAA credentialing agreement to be constitution-
ally valid, it is easy to see how a different court could find that because
WIAA is a state actor, they may not impose vague conditions on the
media, charge a licensing fee for covering the event beyond a certain
length, or have an exclusive license with a news outlet.209 Regardless
of whether the forum is public or non-public, commercial or proprie-
tary, these restrictions are prior restraints on speech outside the fo-
rum, the content of the news, such as the length of broadcast, the
timing of the broadcast, and the medium of the dissemination, which
205. Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Association, 2008-09 Media Policies Reference Guide
at 10 (on file with author).
206. See Miami Herald Pub. Co., Div. of Knight Newspapers, Inc. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241,
258 (1974) (finding that it was unconstitutional to force newspapers to publish responses when
they criticized political candidates and those candidates wanted to reply).
207. Id.
208. Id. ("It has yet to be demonstrated how governmental regulation of this crucial process
can be exercised consistent with First Amendment guarantees of a free press as they have
evolved to this time. Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida is reversed.").
209. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 592-593
(1983) (finding that a tax that singles out the press is unconstitutional); Miami Herald Pub. Co.,
Div. of Knight Newspapers, Inc. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (finding control of news
content which had an impact on length of news to be unconstitutional); WCVB-TV v. Boston
Athletic Ass'n, 926 F.2d 42, 43 (1st Cir. 1991) (refusing to stop a TV station from broadcasting
the Boston Marathon when another had contracted for "exclusive" broadcast rights with the
race organizers); Telemundo of L.A. v. City of L.A., 283 F. Supp. 2d 1095 (C.D. Cal. 2003)
(finding that the city could not provide discriminatory access, between the "official" television
station and another television station, to an official city event); Sherrill v. Knight, 569 F.2d 124
(D.C. Cir. 1977) (ruling that the White House could not arbitrarily discriminate allowing access
to White House press facilities).
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is unconstitutional. 210 The sale of photographic reprints, a constitu-
tionally protected activity, cannot be restricted, and forcing the media
to include certain advertisements in its broadcasts, though not ruled
on in WIAA, would run afoul of previous Supreme Court holdings.2 1 1
VII. COULD SOME RESTRICTIONS AND CONDITIONS
BE CONSTITUTIONAL?
Given the above evaluations, the question remains: what conditions
are permissible? Even in extremely sensitive situations, the govern-
ment generally has not been allowed to punish the media for using
information that it legally obtains. 212 Conditions have been success-
fully imposed on photography of trials, minors, victims of sexual abuse
and jurors.213 In addition, journalists have been required to pass back-
ground checks when national security is an issue. 214 None of these re-
strictions involved requiring a media organization to pay a fee to a
government actor in exchange for the right to broadcast that organiza-
tion's own content, or limits on what the media can do with informa-
tion that does not involve privacy or security interests.215 Even
guidelines for covering sensitive trials cannot "restrict the journalistic
right to gather news unless it is narrowly tailored to prevent a substan-
tial threat to the administration of justice." 216 It follows that any con-
ditions imposed on journalists as a condition of coverage would have
to be similarly narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government
interest. As mentioned above, supporting the public relations interests
of a government actor has previously been held to not be a compelling
210. See Miami Herald Pub. Co., Div. of Knight Newspapers, Inc. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241,
258 (1974) (finding that imposing on the editorial decision-making process of publications is
unconstitutional).
211. See id. (finding that forcing publications to carry certain content is unconstitutional).
212. See Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 530 (1989) (upholding a lower court ruling that a
newspaper could not be punished for publishing truthful information obtained from a police
report that was publicly available, while declining to hold an across-the-board ban on the publi-
cation of truthful information); Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 528 (2001) ("this Court has
repeatedly held that 'if a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of
public significance then state officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the informa-
tion, absent a need . . . of the highest order."').
213. Radio-Television News Directors Ass'n, Cameras in the Court: A State-By-State Guide,
available at http://www.rtdna.org/pages/media-items/cameras-in-the-court-a-state-by-state-guide
55.php?g=45?id=55 (last visited September 27, 2010).
214. See Sherrill v. Knight, 569 F.2d 124 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (commenting that security of the
president is a compelling interest).
215. First Amended Complaint at 11, Wis. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n v. Gannett Co., No.
09-cv-155-wmc, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55137 (W.D. Wis. June 3, 2010), appeal docketed, No 10-
2627 (7th Cir. July 7, 2010).
216. In re Express-News Corp., 695 F.2d 807, 810 (5th Cir. 1982).
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government interest.217 Raising funds is similarly not a compelling
government interest that would justify discrimination between ap-
proved and official photographers, and members of the media. 218
Conditions imposed on what can be done with journalistic content
- whether information, photographs or video - should be distin-
guished from reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on
speech inside a forum.219 It is perfectly permissible for the associations
to impose reasonable restrictions on the location of photographers
and the conduct of journalists, particularly when it is for the protec-
tion of athletes. 220 In fact the associations have such restrictions, and
they are not at issue. These restrictions, however, must not be im-
posed differentially on different photographers. 221 In addition, while
reasonable and evenly applied restrictions on behavior inside a forum
is allowed, the Supreme Court has consistently blocked government
efforts to control lawfully obtained information.222
217. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 613 (1999) (finding that the government goals of good
public relations and accurate reporting did not justify the violation of the Fourth Amendment);
Miami Herald Pub. Co., Div. of Knight Newspapers, Inc. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974)
(rejecting the goal of fair reporting as a justification for violating the First Amendment right of
access); Times-Picayune Publ'g. Corp. v. Lee, No. 88-1325, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3506 at *25
(E.D. La. Apr. 15, 1988) (finding that reporting that conformed to the government's idea of
accurate was not a compelling interest); Borreca v. Fasi, 369 F. Supp. 906, 910-11 (D. Haw. 1974)
(noting that a government official attempts to use his office "to intimidate or to discipline the
press . . . because of what appears in print, a compelling governmental interest that cannot be
served by less restrictive means must be shown for such use to meet Constitutional standards. No
compelling governmental interest has been shown or even claimed here.").
218. Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 228 (1987) (finding that regard-
less of motivation, a tax that charged media organizations differently (based on content) was
unconstitutional, and "an interest in raising revenue, standing alone ... cannot justify the special
treatment of the press, for an alternative means of achieving the same interest without raising
concerns under the First Amendment is clearly available.").
219. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) ("[E]ven in a public forum the
government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected
speech, provided the restrictions are justified without reference to the content of the regulated
speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they
leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information." (emphasis ad-
ded)). See generally Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Association, 2008-09 Media Policies Ref-
erence Guide at 6-8 (on file with author) (designating shooting areas and rules for different
sports).
220. See generally Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Association, 2008-09 Media Policies Ref-
erence Guide at 6-8 (on file with author) (designating shooting areas and rules for different
sports, for example, for gymnastics, no flash is allowed and photographers cannot move from
their location during a routine).
221. Stevens v. N.Y. Racing Ass'n, 665 F. Supp. 164 (D.N.Y. 1987) (finding that differential
treatment of different members of the media was impermissible).
222. See Fla. Star v. B. J. F., 491 U.S. 524, 539 (1989) (finding that a statute making it illegal to
publish names of victims of sex crimes was unconstitutional); Miami Herald Pub. Co., Div. of
Knight Newspapers, Inc. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (finding that regulations of edito-
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IIX. A POSSIBLE DEFENSE FOR THE ASSOCIATIONS: ARE THE
ACTIVITIES THAT THE ASSOCIATIONS ARE TRYING TO RESTRICT
TRULY FIRST AMENDMENT ACTIVITIES?
The final step of a credential analysis involves examining the de-
fenses of the athletic associations. While photography for newsgather-
ing purposes,223 or for a television broadcast,224 is protected by the
First Amendment, athletic associations have inferred that the sale of
reprints is commercial activity and therefore not affected by the same
analysis as traditional newsgathering.225 The associations have also
considered Web galleries, Web broadcasts and live blogging as distinct
from the protected activities of traditional media.226 Thus it is critical
to examine the question of whether or not these activities are pro-
tected by the First Amendment.
A. Web Galleries
It is not likely that Web galleries will be excluded from the First
Amendment, particularly when they are on a news website, and con-
nected with a story.227 They provide a deeper level of coverage than is
possible in a newspaper, permitting the communication of many dif-
ferent moments in the games, and they allow the viewer a deeper un-
derstanding of the game. 2 2 8
rial decisions and judgments are inconsistent with the First Amendment guarantees of free
press).
223. Schnell v. Chicago, 407 F.2d 1084, 1086 (7th Cir. 1969) (noting that when police pre-
vented photojournalists from gathering news, "[t]here can be no conclusion but that the com-
plaint sufficiently alleges that constitutionally protected activity was and continues to be
interfered with by the named defendants and that the defendants have the duty and power to
prevent any future interference.").
224. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Cuomo, 570 F.2d 1080, 1083 (2d Cir. 1977) (finding that excluding a
television station from campaign activities based on their labor dispute violated the First
Amendment Rights of the television station, and issuing an injunction banning the arrest for
trespassing of reporters who crossed a picket line).
225. Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint at 3, Ill. Press Ass'n v. Ill. High Sch. Ass'n, No.
07-CH-885, (Ill. 7th Cir. Sangamon County Dec. 5, 2007).
226. Id.
227. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (explaining that "[i]n deciding whether
particular conduct possesses sufficient communicative elements to bring the First Amendment
into play, we have asked whether "[a]n intent to convey a particularized message was present,
and [whether] the likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those who
viewed it.").
228. WIAA suit aims too high for control of content, Ti-Iu Posr-CRESCENTr (Appleton, Wis.),
March 8, 2009, at lB (explaining that "[a]s a news organization, we're trying to provide the best
coverage of this public event that we can, with whatever technology we have at our disposal.").
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B. Reprint Sales
Because the deal that the associations have with their official pho-
tographers is a commercial deal, they might argue that reprint sales
are not protected by the First Amendment. 229 However, there is suffi-
cient precedent to conclude that a sale of a photograph, particularly
when the photograph is created and sold in connection with a First
Amendment activity, is protected by the First Amendment. 2 3 0 Even a
person's "right of publicity" does not overcome the protection of the
First Amendment. 231 When a California newspaper sold posters that
reproduced its front page, which included a photograph of Joe Mon-
tana winning the Super Bowl, Montana sued, arguing that the poster
was a violation of his right of publicity. The court ruled that the poster
was protected by the First Amendment, despite Montana's rights. 2 3 2
Similarly, a New York court, following other rulings in the state, held
that a professional art photographer had a right to sell and display a
candid photograph of a conservative Jewish man who did not consent
to the photo. The man's belief that the photograph violated his relig-
ious beliefs did not overcome the First Amendment right of the pho-
tographer. 233 And the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit ruled that a painting of Tiger Woods competing in a golf tour-
nament was protected by the First Amendment and the right of the
artist to sell posters which reproduced the painting did not violate
Woods' right of publicity.234 Photographic reprints are creative and
229. See Foto USA, Inc. v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys., 141 F.3d 1032 (11th Cir. 1998)
(deciding that an exclusive contract for commercial photography rights at a graduation cere-
mony was permissible).
230. See Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, 34 Cal. App. 4th 790, 797 (Ct. App. 1995) ("a
newspaper has a constitutional right to promote itself by reproducing its originally protected
articles or photographs.").
231. See id. at 795 (explaining "right of publicity," as a right "based upon the plaintiff's right
to use his own name and likeness for his own benefit," while noting that "public figures do not
retain the right of publicity against the use of name and likeness in the news media.").
232. See id. (finding that posters reproducing newspaper front pages that had a photograph
quarterback Joe Montana were entitled to First Amendment protection, just as the original
newspaper accounts were. The posters were a "form of public interest presentation to which
protection must be extended.").
233. See Nussenzweig v. DiCorcia, 814 N.Y.S.2d 891 (Sup. Ct. 2006) (finding that the sale of
photographic prints of a Hassidic Jew who asserted a privacy claim was protected by the First
Amendment because it was art: "In recent years, some New York courts have addressed the
issue of whether an artistic use of an image is a use exempted from action under New York
States Privacy Laws. They have consistently found 'art' to be constitutionally protected free
speech, that is so exempt. This court agrees." (citations omitted)), aff'd, 832 N.Y.S.2d 510 (App.
Div. 2007), affd, 9 N.Y.3d 184 (2007).
234. ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 938 (6th Cir. 2003) (addressing the First
Amendment interests of the artist versus the publicity rights of Tiger Woods). The court found:
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artistic expressions, as well as journalistic representations of the event
covered, communicating information and ideas to the viewer.235
Finally, the mere fact that photographic reprints are sold at a profit
(typical a very small one) is not sufficient to remove First Amendment
protection. Books, newspapers, magazines, and films are all sold at a
profit and that does not affect their level of First Amendment
protection.236
C. Online video, extended broadcasts and live blogging
The WIAA ruling sets the precedent for the concept that an online
broadcast of a game is not journalism, but a commercial activity.237
But while the Internet is a relatively new medium, it is subject to the
same rules of copyright and First Amendment as other mediums. 238 In
fact, Internet communication was upheld as protected First Amend-
ment communication by the Supreme Court in Reno v. ACLU. 2 3 9
Thus a Webcast should not be treated differently by courts than other
speech, and like other speech, it should not be restricted without a
compelling government interest, and an accompanying narrowly tai-
lored restriction.
[A]fter balancing the societal and personal interests embodied in the First Amend-
ment against Woods's property rights, we conclude that the effect of limiting Woods's
right of publicity in this case is negligible and significantly outweighed by society's in-
terest in freedom of artistic expression. . . Because Rush's work has substantial trans-
formative elements, it is entitled to the full protection of the First Amendment. In this
case, we find that Woods's right of publicity must yield to the First Amendment.
Id.
235. A published photograph of a sporting event involves significant creativity, talent and a
series of creative decisions. The author reaches this conclusion based on the following facts from
her personal experience: The photographer must determine which lens to use, where to stand at
a particular moment in the game, what camera settings to use, how to frame the image, how to
focus the camera and when to fire the shutter to capture what is known as the "decisive mo-
ment." The photographer also engages in creative decisions during the editing process, when
selecting which photograph or photographs to publish or offer for publication. A photographer
who covers a football game, for example, might take over 500 images but only select the best 10
to 20 to publish to a Web gallery.
236. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952) ("That books, newspapers, and
magazines are published and sold for profit does not prevent them from being a form of expres-
sion whose liberty is safeguarded by the First Amendment. We fail to see why operation for
profit should have any different effect in the case of motion pictures.").
237. See generally Wis. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n v. Gannett Co., No. 09-cv-155-wmc, 2010
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55137 (W.D. Wis. June 3, 2010), appeal docketed, No 10-2627 (7th Cir. July 7,
2010).
238. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 506 (2001) (finding that reproduction of copy-
righted material in an electronic database was not covered under the original contract). See also
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (finding the Communications Decency Act, which regulated
indecent and offensive content on the Internet, violated the First Amendment).
239. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (finding the Communications Decency Act, which
regulated indecent and offensive content on the Internet, to be unconstitutional).
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IX. CONCLUSION
Both the high school athletic associations and college athletic as-
sociations involved are clearly state actors. As such, the newsgathering
of video or photographs can only be regulated or limited based on
compelling government interests that would be on par with preserving
a right to a fair trial240 or protecting the privacy of inmates241 - the
interests of public relations and raising revenue are not compelling
interests that justify burdening the First Amendment.242 The sporting
events are public events and once the media is invited, the state actors
cannot discriminate against members of the media, or impose restric-
tions on the media regarding the type of editorial product they pro-
duce without a narrowly tailored and compelling government
interest. 243 If the national security at issue in the Pentagon Papers case
is not sufficient to outweigh the First Amendment right to report, it is
hard to imagine how the profitability of an athletic association, acting
under color of law, would outweigh the First Amendment.244 Absent
such a compelling government interest, the media has a right to report
any news that it gathers, and any denial of such rights would have to
overcome a heavy presumption of unconstitutionality. 245 It is reasona-
ble to conclude that a state actor cannot restrict the First Amendment
use of information, photographs, or video and such First Amendment
use includes Webcasting, live blogging, and reprint sales from a state
sports tournament or a college game involving state universities. 246 If
court rulings do not resolve these questions favorably to the news or-
240. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 551 (1965) (reversing a conviction on the grounds that the
presence of "at least 12 cameramen" in part because "[c]ables and wires were snaked across the
courtroom floor, three microphones were on the judge's bench and others were beamed at the
jury box and the counsel table," created an unfair trial for the defendant).
241. See Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1, 5 (1978) (noting the privacy interests of the inmates
while finding that media access to a prison could be restricted).
242. See Ark. Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 228 (1987) (rejecting "raising
revenue" as a compelling interest to justify differential taxation of the media).
243. See Miami Herald Pub. Co., Div. of Knight Newspapers, Inc. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241,
258 (1974) (finding that regulations of editorial decisions and judgments are inconsistent with the
First Amendment guarantees of free press).
244. See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (finding that the government
could not prevent a newspaper from publishing truthful information that may affect interna-
tional relations); see also Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 528 (2001) ("As a general matter,
state action to punish the publication of truthful information seldom can satisfy constitutional
standards.").
245. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) ("Any system of prior re-
straints of expression comes to this court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional
validity.").
246. Miami Herald Pub. Co., Div. of Knight Newspapers, Inc. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258
(1974) (finding that regulations of editorial decisions and judgments are inconsistent with the
First Amendment guarantees of free press).
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ganizations, news organizations are likely to continue to pursue legis-
lation that would ban such restrictions. 247 One thing is certain-as the
ways to deliver information and images continue to evolve, news orga-
nizations will continue to clash with governments and state actors who
want to control the distribution of that information. But as some of
these fights have demonstrated, even in the internet age, those who
buy ink by the barrel248 are fierce adversaries, made tougher by the
power of the First Amendment. One way or another, news organiza-
tions appear to have no intention of being "shut out" for long.
247. See Mark Fitzgerald, Law Letting Papers Sell High School Sports Photos Sails Through
Ill. Senate Panel, Eorro & PUBLISHER, (March 10, 2008) (describing how a state law was on the
road to passage during the dispute between the IHSA and the Illinois newspapers); see also
Assem. B. 520, 2009-10 Leg., 99th Sess. (Wis. 2009) (failed to pass, April 28, 2010) (proposing a
requirement that interscholastic athletic associations to be governed by public records and open
meetings laws). Although the bill in Wisconsin failed, the bill in Illinois was progressing well, but
was dropped when the parties settled. See Illinois Press Association, IHSA, Settle Photography
Dispute, National Press Photographers Association, April 8, 2008, available at http://
www.nppa.org/news-andevents/news/2008/04/illinoisll.html (last visited September 27, 2010)
("The terms of the settlement agreement call for the withdrawal of Illinois legislation, intro-
duced in the state's Senate and House in January and already passed in the House.").
248. The American adage advising against picking a fight with a man "who buys ink by the
barrel" has been credited in case law to both Mark Twain and publicist William I. Greener, Jr.
See, e.g., Brown v. Kelly Broad. Co., 48 Cal. 3d 711, 744 (Cal. 1989) (crediting Twain as the
source of the famous adage); State ex rel. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co. v. Geauga Cty. Court of
Common Pleas, Juv. Div., 90 Ohio St. 3d 79, 89, (Pfiefer, J., dissenting) ("The majority has ele-
vated Greener's law ('Never argue with a man who buys ink by the barrel')"). However, re-
searchers indicate that the true source of the quote is undetermined. RALPHt KE'YES, TiH Quo-TE
VERIFIER: WHo SAID WHAT, WHERE AND WHEN 64 (St. Martin's Press, 2006).
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